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ABSTRACT 
 
This Master’s thesis examines whether risk-managing industry Momentum via the 
methodology of Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) produces a more profitable strategy 
than industry Momentum by itself. Industry Momentum is also tested in a previously 
unexamined period to see whether or not the strategy still produces abnormal returns. 
 
By using data from the U.S. stock market between 1928 – 2015, multivariate 
regressions that utilize the Fama-French Three and Five Factor Model are run in an 
attempt to explain returns to industry Momentum and risk-managed industry 
Momentum. Additionally, robustness tests are conducted in the same vein in subsample 
time-periods. 
 
The results indicate that risk-managed industry Momentum produces statistically 
significant abnormal returns in all time-periods tested. Industry Momentum is also still 
found to be prevalent in the U.S. stock market in producing abnormal returns. Risk-
managed industry Momentum is more profitable as well, compared to industry 
Momentum by measuring Sharpe ratios and abnormal returns for both strategies. 
 
These findings suggest that risk-managing Momentum with the Barroso and Santa Clara 
methodology works not only for individual stocks, but industries as well. Risk-
managing industry Momentum produces significant abnormal returns and a high Sharpe 
ratio while eliminating negative skewness in return distribution. This arguably 
eliminates Momentum crashes from industry Momentum completely. 
KEYWORDS: Momentum, risk-managed, industry, profitability 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The search for superior sources of returns is arguably the very crux of investor 
participation in financial markets. Times change, fads differ, and theory develops but 
the struggle to find new investment strategies that will aid investors in beating the 
market never disappears. Though fundamental analysis and portfolio theory 
(Markowitz, 1953) are the mainstays in screening for investment worthy stocks, there is 
an increasing amount of quantitative investment strategies that rely on studies produced 
in academic finance (Asness, Ilmanen, Israel & Moskowitz, 2015). One of these 
strategies is Momentum investing. Although originally discovered by Levy (1967), 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) sparked widespread academic interest in Momentum, 
which has created a baffled following of researchers and investors alike, where the 
former seek to find the source for the strategy’s returns and the latter seek to capitalize 
on those returns. Momentum – or the tendency of winners to keep on winning and 
losers to keep on losing – has commanded the attention of financial academia. As 
Momentum bases itself on nothing more than historical price data, it continues to 
present a serious challenge for the theory of efficient markets (Fama, 1970). This has 
led to a dichotomy in explanations for Momentum, where in addition to efficient market 
advocates, behaviorists have joined the fray, in seeking explanations for Momentum 
returns. Even though Momentum is cornered on both sides by two schools of thought, 
its mean return origins remain a mystery. It is a common notion to conjecture that once 
an anomaly’s origins are revealed, it subsequently disappears. The continued existence 
of Momentum thus makes it a strong candidate for an investment strategy to be utilized 
by investors.  
 
Regardless of the motivation to utilize Momentum, the phenomenon is geographically 
widespread, prevalent across asset classes, and robust across different time periods 
(Asness, Frazzini, Israel & Moskowitz, 2014). Industries exemplify the widespread 
reach of the Momentum effect (Moskowitz & Grinblatt, 1999; Nijman, Swinkels & 
Verbeek, 2004; Pan, Liano & Huang, 2004; Du & Denning, 2005). Just as with stocks, 
going long in recent winner industries and selling short recent loser industries, produces 
abnormal returns. With the rapid rise of Exchange Traded Funds (ETF), investors may 
access Momentum by buying industries through ETF’s, which creates an easy route to 
harnessing the strategy compared to individual stocks. Therefore, investigating further 
possibilities of enhancing industry Momentum strategies poses a viable avenue of 
research. 
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This success of Momentum makes it a very viable investment strategy capable of 
producing abnormal returns for investors. As with any popular phenomenon however, 
there are those who seek to highlight the risks involved. In the case of Momentum, 
rightly so, as the strategy does suffer from downside risk namely by possessing the 
built-in risk of Momentum crashes (Daniel & Moskowitz, 2015). These crashes, which 
are evident in the negative skewness of Momentum return distributions, constrain the 
profitability of the strategy and steer the more risk-averse investors away. Momentum 
experiences these crashes when negative market conditions undergo a rebound and the 
loser stocks climb faster than the winners, resulting in negative returns for the strategy. 
There is a budding niche in Momentum literature, which seeks to control and minimize 
the crash risk associated with Momentum (Asness, Moskowitz & Pedersen, 2013; 
Barroso & Santa-Clara, 2015). In fact, Barroso and Santa-Clara have developed a 
method of risk-management for stock-based Momentum, which works through scaling 
the strategy via realized variances of daily returns. This strategy has greatly decreased 
the negative skewness of Momentum and as a result, the downside effect of Momentum 
crashes. Needless to say, by decreasing Momentum’s risk, the profitability of stock-
based Momentum has been enhanced greatly. As a result of the work of Barroso and 
Santa-Clara, questions arise on the efficacy of their methodology. Mainly, does the 
strategy apply equally across countries, time-periods, and different securities? It would 
stand to reason, that if risk-managing Momentum worked in industries for example, this 
would highlight a previously undiscovered profitable investment strategy, which would 
be easier to utilize than stock-based Momentum and would potentially trump the 
profitability of regular industry Momentum. In addition to highlighting a profitable 
investment strategy, the success of risk-managing industry Momentum would provide 
further proof, that the findings of Barroso and Santa-Clara are indeed groundbreaking in 
the field of academic Momentum literature. 
1.1. The Purpose of the Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether or not industry Momentum may be 
risk-managed similarly to individual stock Momentum in Barroso and Santa Clara 
(2015) and whether this increases the profitability of industry Momentum when 
compared to its regular non-managed version. This research question is ultimately 
answered via multivariate regressions using data from the U.S. stock market from 1928 
to 2015. To run the regressions, Momentum portfolio sorts are conducted, after which 
the returns for the strategy are calculated. As a consequence, to the primary purpose, 
further research questions will be answered concerning the continuing existence of 
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industry Momentum in the U.S. Comparing the findings of this thesis to previous 
studies of industry Momentum and to the original risk-managed Momentum paper by 
Barroso & Santa Clara (2015) will reveal whether the risk-managed industry 
Momentum strategy outperforms regular industry Momentum and risk-managed 
individual stock Momentum. By answering the purpose of this thesis, a clear 
contribution to the literature is made. First off, this thesis performs an analysis 
analogous to the one conducted on stock price Momentum by Barroso and Santa Clara 
(2015), but in an industry context. Secondly, by investigating the profitability of risk-
managed industry Momentum, an entirely new research question will be answered as 
there are no prior studies that have researched this very topic ever before. At the 
moment of writing this thesis, the only research conducted on risk-managed Momentum 
is the original piece of work by Barroso & Santa Clara (2015). Thus investigating its 
interaction with sector Momentum is the first research expanding beyond regular 
Momentum and it entails potentially unveiling a new and effective investment strategy 
that may have real-life implications. Last but not least, this thesis may shed further light 
on the nature of Momentum, offering for example, further insight into the prevailing 
debate over whether the return characteristics for individual stock Momentum and 
industry Momentum are homogenous (Grinblatt & Moskowitz, 1999; Nijman et al., 
2004; Pan et al., 2004; Du & Denning, 2005)). After reading through this thesis, the 
reader will understand whether combining industry Momentum with risk-management 
via the methodology presented by Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) produces statistically 
significant abnormal returns and whether this combination outperforms its respective 
benchmarks in regular industry Momentum and risk-managed individual stock 
Momentum. 
1.2. The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters, each of which may contain a various number of 
subheadings. This first chapter serves as an introduction to the thesis, shedding light on 
the purpose of the thesis, the structure, and the research hypotheses that will be 
investigated. Chapter two will discuss the theory of efficient markets, which is 
presented as a necessary backdrop in understanding the nature of anomalous returns and 
thus the nature of Momentum returns. Understanding the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(Fama, 1970) (EMH) highlights the importance of potential significant findings.  The 
third chapter discusses how stock prices are formed on a theoretical level in order for 
the reader to understand how price reactions associated with Momentum may conflict 
with these principal theories. This is yet again a framework, which should clarify for the 
reader, the anomalous nature of Momentum returns. Part four introduces the relevant 
 12 
prior research into Momentum, building a historical analysis for what has been done in 
academic finance in terms of studying the phenomenon. This chapter demonstrates the 
power of the Momentum effect and describes its prevalence in a wide variety of 
samples. Chapter five will introduce the relevant prior research related to industry 
Momentum. This is similar in nature to chapter four and serves to introduce the 
concepts and methods used in studying industry Momentum, as they will play an 
important role in understanding the methodologies employed in this study. Chapter six 
discusses Barroso and Santa Clara’s (2015) risk-adjusted Momentum which is the focal 
point in terms of answering the research question in this thesis. Therefore, it is natural to 
present the study along with the methodologies used in its own separate chapter, as 
these methodologies will serve an integral part in the empirical work conducted at the 
end of the thesis. Chapter seven presents the data and methodologies used in this thesis. 
It serves to highlight the process followed to reach the eventual results presented. 
Chapter eight focuses on the results of the study. It will also entail analysis, discussion, 
and interpretation of said results. Finally, chapter nine will conclude this thesis and 
summarize the findings and their implications briefly. 
1.3. Research Hypotheses 
This thesis aims to answer two main hypotheses, each having a null hypothesis and an 
alternate one. The first hypothesis can be considered a basis for the study to build upon 
and it aims to investigate whether industry Momentum is still present in the U.S. stock 
market with up-to-date data from Kenneth French’s website (French, 2016). The first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H0: Industry Momentum does not produce statistically significant abnormal 
returns in the U.S. stock market for the given time period. 
 
H1: Industry Momentum does produce statistically significant abnormal returns 
in the U.S. stock market for the given time period. 
 
The second of the hypotheses investigates whether or not risk-managing industry 
Momentum produces statistically significant abnormal returns and thus can increase the 
Sharpe ratio of industry Momentum similarly to what Barroso & Santa Clara (2015) 
show in the case of ordinary stock Momentum. This hypothesis will therefore reveal 
whether risk-managed industry Momentum is a viable and profitable investment 
strategy. Additionally, if the conclusion to this hypothesis is that risk-managed industry 
Momentum produces significant abnormal returns, then the case for the way in which, 
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Barroso and Santa Clara manage the risk of Momentum is strengthened via this out-of-
sample test. If the findings support Barroso and Santa Clara’s methodology, then it is 
also a clear indicator that further studies on applying risk-managed Momentum should 
be conducted for example, in different countries and different asset classes. The second 
pair of hypotheses are: 
 
H0: Risk-managed industry Momentum does not produce statistically significant 
abnormal returns in the U.S. stock market for the given time period. 
 
H1: Risk-managed industry Momentum does produce positive statistically 
significant abnormal returns in the U.S. stock market for the given time period. 
 
The first pair of hypotheses offer no original contribution to the literature as such, but 
instead aim to confirm previous findings in a slightly different time period in order to 
form a basis for the inspection of the second pair of hypotheses. The second hypothesis 
however, contribute to the literature in an original way by combining two different 
aspects of Momentum that have both been previously studied in finance. Following this, 
whether or not the hypotheses will be rejected or failed to be rejected, isn’t arguably the 
main concern here, as either way the results of this study begin a stream of research 
either rebuking or supporting this specific methodology of Momentum risk-
management and its ability to decrease Momentum crash risk and increase Sharpe 
ratios.  
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2. EFFICIENT MARKETS 
Viewing Momentum from the perspective of market efficiency is critical. The 
anomalous returns from Momentum present a clear challenge to the viability of efficient 
markets. Therefore, market efficiency is a natural and highly relevant point of view in 
trying to explain Momentum returns. 
2.1. Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Eugene Fama not only contributed an important piece of work on efficient markets in 
1970, but is often thought of as the founding father of this specific and widespread 
school of thought. In his paper “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theoretical and 
Empirical Work” Fama (1970) describes efficient markets as prices always fully 
reflecting all available information. This Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) means 
that any events or actions with consequences to firms will have an immediate and 
correct reaction on the firm’s stock price. This way, no one can take advantage of 
informational asymmetry and profit off of delayed price reactions. 
 
The importance of efficient markets is evident when one considers the functionality of 
capital markets as a whole. The primary objective of capital markets is to allocate the 
economy’s capital stock (Fama, 1970). If this doesn’t happen in an efficient way, its 
consequences will likely lead to disruptions in the markets and therefore disruptions in 
the economy. 
2.2. Three Forms of Market Efficiency 
The empirical work on efficient markets by Fama (1970) can be divided into three 
subsets or levels of efficiency. These subsets or levels can be distinguished by the extent 
to which “all information” is reflected in the market (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2014). 
  
 1.  Weak-form efficiency asserts that all historical information relating to 
  price and volume are already reflected in stock prices (Fama, 1970). This 
  means that trend or technical analysis based on historical price changes is 
  futile. Using technical analysis in weak-form efficient markets is thus not 
  going to work in providing investors with returns. 
 
 2. Semistrong-form efficiency instills the notion that in addition to  
  historical data on price and volume, fundamental information regarding 
  firms is also publicly available (Fama, 1970). This includes company 
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  balance sheets, patent portfolios and earnings forecasts among other 
  things (Bodie et al., 2014) and all of this information is reflected in 
  prices.  
 
 3. The strong form efficiency entails that all information available is  
  reflected in stock market prices (Fama, 1970). This means that stock 
  prices efficiently react to even information available only to company 
  insiders (Bodie et al., 2014). 
 
Fama (1970) presents that weak-form tests of market efficiency have been widely 
conducted and that there is evidence to suggest, that the stock market is indeed weak-
form efficient. This assertion is not likely endorsed by advocates of technical analysis, 
who suggest that historical data can help in timing sales for example and that this may 
lead to higher returns compared to the market. In the same vein, Momentum, which 
relies only on historical price data, presents a serious discord in the empirical 
discussions surrounding even weak-form efficient markets. 
 
On strong form efficiency Fama (1970) concludes that it is not likely to hold true for the 
stock market. Instead, strong form efficiency, where all available information is 
reflected in stock prices, should be viewed as a sort of benchmark in studies further 
investigating market efficiency. Fama touched upon this remark of strong form 
efficiency again in his 1991 paper where he added that as there are surely positive 
information and trading costs related to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, strong form 
efficiency must clearly be false. He also reiterated that even in 1991, the strong form 
efficient version of the EMH could still serve as a benchmark for further studies (Fama, 
1991). 
 
Even though the EMH is confronted by ambiguity through information costs, Fama 
(1991) claims that the biggest problem to the EMH is the joint-hypothesis approach to 
testing market efficiency. Market efficiency is by proxy tested through asset-pricing 
models. If asset-pricing models can explain stock market returns, then by proxy, 
markets are efficient. Market efficiency per se is not testable in itself and that’s why it is 
usually tested through these joint-hypotheses. This poses the obvious problem of 
creating asset-pricing models that are accurate and can explain returns despite where 
they stem from. Momentum for example, produces anomalous mean returns that no 
pricing model can wholly explain. 
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Despite the challenges that tests for market efficiency face, Fama (1991) claims that 
asset-pricing models are scientifically useful in studying market efficiency. Fama still 
holds, that despite their usefulness the joint-hypothesis issue leaves much to be desired 
in drawing precise inferences about market efficiency. 
 
Event studies are often used to study market efficiency (Fama, 1991). The purpose of 
event studies is to accurately pinpoint and record events to see whether or not they have 
a direct effect on price changes. These changes are tested for statistical significance and 
based on the results, they are deemed to offer evidence of market efficiency.  
 
Market efficiency is most often called into question through the existence of anomalous 
returns to assets. Anomalies in financial markets are returns that cannot be thoroughly 
explained by asset-pricing models (Schwert, 2002). This in turn is taken as evidence for 
inefficient markets or inefficient underlying asset-pricing models. The inability to 
reconcile the source of this inefficiency again highlights the problems surrounding the 
joint-hypothesis problem. 
 
Schwert (2002) questions the notion of whether or not anomalies are persistent enough 
to be taken as evidence towards market inefficiency. According to Schwert many 
anomalies weaken or disappear over time after their academic discovery. Whether this 
weakening or disappearance can be attributed to being only historically anomalous or 
the anomalous opportunities being arbitraged away, anomalies in financial markets do 
not seem to persist. It is important to notice however that the evidence in favor of 
Momentum seems to persist over time. Schwert claims that this persistence may be 
explained by a yet unidentified risk factor that accounts for the high returns. The 
assertion of an undiscovered risk factor explaining Momentum returns seems to be a 
very popular notion in financial literature, especially held in high regard by 
representatives of the efficient markets school of thought. 
 
In conclusion to the EMH, all forms have in common the notion, that prices should 
reflect information (Bodie et al., 2014). The degree of efficiency however seems to be 
highly debatable. Even Fama (1970, 1991) who created the notion of three forms of 
market efficiency has been documented as saying that strong form efficiency should 
serve only as a benchmark. Supporters of technical analysis, or Momentum for that 
matter, might be willing to argue that even weak-form efficiency isn’t present in stock 
markets. As the main topic of this thesis, Momentum adds to this conundrum of 
efficiency by its unexplained anomalous returns.  
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3. STOCK PRICE THEORY 
In discerning the origin of Momentum’s returns, it is important to understand the 
different theories behind stock price formation. Momentum directly relies on stock price 
changes and therefore understanding the basic principles of how these prices are 
formed, at the very least on a theoretical level, is crucial to beginning to understand 
Momentum. Just as information affects the prices of stocks, so do for example future 
cash flows, future dividends and different risk factors. These are important notions 
when considering anomalous returns, such as those produced by Momentum, and their 
underlying causes. In this chapter, five different models of how asset prices – mainly 
stocks – are formed will be discussed. 
3.1. Dividend Discount Model 
The dividend discount model (DDM) suggests that a stock’s price is formed through its 
discounted future dividends from present time to perpetuity (Bodie et al., 2014). 
 
(1.)  𝑉0 =  
𝐷1
1+𝑘
+  
𝐷2
(1+𝑘)2
+  
𝐷3
(1+𝑘)3
+  … +  
𝐷𝑡
(1+𝑘)𝑡
 
 
Where, V0 is the price of stock at time 0, D is the dividend at a certain time t, and k is 
the return on equity. (Bodie et al., 2014) 
 
The DDM asserts that investors ignore capital gains as such, and that dividends actually 
already take into account future capital gains. This assertion is based on capital gains 
being reflected in the dividends at the time the stock is sold. In other words, the DDM 
states that the stock price is based solely on cash flows incoming to shareholders, and 
these cash flows are dividends. (Bodie et al., 2014) 
 
Following this logic Momentum should be easily tracked by following announcements 
concerning firm dividend policy. As announcements affecting dividend policy are 
available to everyone, Momentum would most likely be arbitraged away. This however 
is not the case and as returns to Momentum aren’t tied to stocks with high dividend 
yields, the DDM cannot explain why Momentum is so profitable. 
3.2. Free Cash Flow Valuation Model 
An alternative to the DDM, the free cash flow (FCF) valuation model is essentially 
based on the same logic as the DDM. Both the DDM and FCF model hold that stock 
prices are based on cash flows. The DDM asserts that cash flows are nothing more than 
dividends and therefore relies on discounting future dividends to reveal the current price 
of a share. The FCF model however differs in the way it discerns what makes up cash 
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flows. In the FCF model free cash flow is what’s available to equity holders net of 
capital expenditures (Bodie et al., 2014). The FCF model works especially well with 
firms that issue no dividends, but it can be used with any kind of firms and the model 
may deliver useful information out of the scope of the DDM. 
 
To further enhance the usefulness of the FCF model, instead of using return on equity in 
the denominator, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) can be employed. 
Consequently, debt can be subtracted from the WACC to find the value of equity. After 
calculating the value of a company this way, the value of a single stock must be derived 
by dividing with the shares outstanding in the company. (Bodie et al., 2014) 
 
(2.) 𝑃0 =  ∑
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1+𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑡
∞
𝑡=1  
 
Where, 
P0 is the value of the company at time 0, t is the time period, FCF is the free cash flow, 
and WACC is the weighted average cost of capital (Puttonen & Knüpfer, 2009). 
3.3. The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965), is a renowned formula for explaining returns in relation to systematic risk, or 
Beta. The CAPM was one of the first asset pricing models that became popular in 
academic research concerning market efficiency. It is still in use and occasionally serves 
as one of the asset-pricing models in joint-hypotheses when studying market efficiency.  
 
The first part of the CAPM represents the risk-free rate of return. It is then followed by 
the Beta that acts as a proxy for systematic risk for the stock at hand. The risk premium 
for a single stock is then calculated by multiplying the risk premium of the market 
portfolio with the Beta of the stock in question and adding the risk-free rate of return. 
(Puttonen & Knüpfer, 2009) 
 
(3.) 𝐸(𝑟𝑖) =  𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖[𝐸(𝑟𝑚) −  𝑟𝑓] 
 
Where, E(ri) is the expected return for stock i, rf is the risk-free return, Bi is the 
systematic risk of stock i, and E(rm) is the expected return for the market (Puttonen & 
Knüpfer, 2009). 
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As many models that attempt to describe real world phenomena, the CAPM has a set of 
assumptions that it relies on to hold true for it to be applicable immaculately. Below is a 
list of these: 
 
 1.  Investors are rational mean-variance optimizers. 
 2.  Their planning horizon is a single period. 
 3.  Investors have homogenous expectations. 
 4.  All assets are publicly held and traded on public exchanges, short  
  positions are allowed and investors can borrow or lend at a common risk-
  free rate. 
 5.  All information is publicly available. 
 6.  Profits aren’t taxed. 
 7.  No transaction costs on trades. 
 (Bodie et al., 2014) 
 
At least three of the assumptions of the CAPM present major challenges to the model. 
All assets trade, no transaction costs for trades and single period planning horizons are 
restrictions that have prompted research and development of extensions for the CAPM. 
There’s arguably another set of problems inherent in the use of Beta as a measure for 
systematic risk. As Beta’s are mostly calculated with regressions, they only present a 
proxy for systematic risk during the very day of calculation. So Beta doesn’t take into 
account possible changes stemming from events taking place with the passing of time. 
Liquidity is another factor affecting systematic risk as increases or decreases in one 
stock’s liquidity affects every other stock’s liquidity. This correlation makes up 
liquidity risk, which is a component of systematic risk that the CAPM is unable to 
account for. Even though the CAPM has failed numerous empirical tests, the intrinsic 
logic behind the model has kept it at the center of financial research through the years. 
(Bodie et al., 2014) 
3.4. Fama & French Three Factor Model 
The Fama & French Three Factor Model (FF3) (Fama & French, 1993) is widely 
regarded as the next step in the evolution of asset-pricing models, superseding the 
CAPM. The FF3 originally rose out of a need to quantify the size-risk premium (Bodie 
et al., 2014). The CAPM was never able to fully explain what accounted for the 
anomalous returns on small-cap value firms and the FF3 was created to answer that 
challenge.  
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The FF3 equation relates that all returns excess of the risk-free rate are explained by the 
sensitivity of said returns to three factors. These factors are: excess returns on a broad 
market portfolio (Rm - rf), the difference of returns between a portfolio of small stocks 
and large stocks (SMB) and the difference of returns between a portfolio of high book-
to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks (HML). (Fama & French, 1993) 
 
If the three factors presented in the FF3 were to be the only risk factors on the market, 
then the intercept of the regression for every portfolio should be at the very most 0 
(Bodie et al., 2014). Fama & French (1996) suggest something along these lines in their 
most aggressive conclusions as they state that the FF3 could be an equilibrium-pricing 
model. However, the truth is more likely along the lines of the less aggressive 
conclusions they draw in suggesting that the FF3 is a liberal explanation for returns and 
average returns. Regardless of where along this continuum the FF3 lies, it manages to 
explain variation in cross-sections of average returns and anomalous returns that the 
CAPM cannot (Fama & French, 1992, 1996). 
 
Even though the FF3 manages to explain many of the anomalies that the CAPM can’t, it 
is important to realize that the FF3 has not been able to account for the anomalous 
returns of Momentum (Fama & French, 1993, 1996). In trying to do so, Fama and 
French found the intercepts of Momentum returns to be reliably positive. In fact, the 
intercepts were greater for the FF3 than they were for the CAPM, which is somewhat 
puzzling as in general, the FF3 is regarded as a more robust asset-pricing model than the 
CAPM.  
 
The regression for the FF3: 
 
(4.) 𝑅𝑖 −  𝑅𝑓 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Where, Ri is the return on stock/portfolio i, Rf is the risk-free return, ai is the intercept of 
the regression for stock/portfolio i, bi(rm-rf) is the factor beta for market returns 
multiplied by market index return, siSMB is the factor beta for Small Minus Big 
multiplied by returns for Small Minus Big, hiHML is the factor beta for High Minus 
Low multiplied by returns for High Minus Low, ei is the product of other factors 
affecting stock/portfolio i (Fama & French, 1996). 
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3.5. Fama & French Five Factor Model 
 In a very recent publication Fama & French (2015) refined their FF3 by adding two 
more risk factors, in the hopes that this revised factor model can further explain 
variations in average returns. In the Fama-French Five Factor Model (FF5), they have 
added profitability – as is proposed by Novy-Marx (2013) – and investment-to-market 
to accompany size and book-to-market factors. Profitability as a factor takes into 
account the difference of portfolios constructed upon robust and weak profitability 
(RMW) in firms and investment as a factor takes into account the difference of 
portfolios constructed upon conservative and aggressive investing (CMA) in firms. The 
rationale for adding two more factors comes from the purpose of constructing an 
evaluation model where the risk-factors included act as proxies.  
 
Fama and French (2015) sought out to apply their FF5 to explain returns of prevalent 
anomalies. They compared their results to the FF3 to see whether the FF5 was more 
capable of explaining anomalous returns. In addition to this Fama and French 
investigated whether problems in asset-pricing models didn’t derive from separate 
anomalies but in fact from a single source. 
 
The results of the comparisons of the FF3 and FF5 indicate that in general the FF5 
regressions accrued intercepts that were closer to 0 than the FF3, suggesting that the 
FF5 is indeed a more robust asset-pricing model than its predecessor (Fama & French, 
2015). An interesting finding was however that a four-factor model without the HML 
factor prevailed as well as the five-factor model in explaining variations in average 
returns. Often the size factor of SMB is considered rather diluted in modern stock 
markets, so in a way it is rather surprising that the four-factor model without HML 
prevailed as well as the FF5. Nonetheless, Fama and French estimate that the FF5 
explains 71-94% of cross-section variance in expected returns for the portfolios they 
constructed in accordance to the five factors.  
 
An important takeaway from Fama & French’s paper is that the FF5 was unable to 
explain Momentum profits. This poses the question of how well the model fares in 
relation to the hypotheses tested later in this thesis. However, it is to be noted that Fama 
& French never meant to actually explain Momentum profits in their paper directly, but 
approached the matter through implicit factors. (Fama & French, 2015) 
 
The FF5 equation: 
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(5.) 𝑅(𝑡) − 𝑅𝑓(𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝑏[𝑅𝑀(𝑡) − 𝑅𝑓(𝑡)] + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝑡) + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿(𝑡) + 𝑟𝑅𝑀𝑊(𝑡) +
𝑐𝐶𝑀𝐴(𝑡) + 𝜀(𝑡) 
 
Where, R(t) is the return on portfolio t, Rf(t) is the return on a risk-free portfolio, a is the 
intercept of the multivariate regression, b[Rm(t)-Rf(t)] is the factor beta for market 
returns multiplied by market index return, sSMB(t) is the factor beta for Small Minus 
Big multiplied by returns on Small Minus Big, hHML(t) is the factor beta for High 
Minus Low multiplied by returns on High Minus Low, rRMW(t) is the factor beta for 
Robust Minus Weak multiplied by returns on Robust Minus Weak, cCMA(t) is the 
factor beta for Conservative Minus Aggressive multiplied by returns on         
Conservative Minus Aggressive, e(t) is the product of factors affecting portfolio t (Fama 
& French, 2014). 
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4. MOMENTUM 
4.1. History of Momentum 
The discovery of Momentum is attributed to Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) in their 
seminal paper “Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock 
Market Efficiency”. In their paper Jegadeesh and Titman find that sorting stocks into 
deciles according to their intermediate and recent historical returns and subsequently 
taking long positions in the top firms and shorting the dismal ones led to abnormal 
returns in the intermediate future. Jegadeesh & Titman claimed that these abnormal 
returns couldn’t be explained by systematic risk or delayed reactions to common factors 
influencing stock prices. They did however find that the abnormal returns from 
Momentum dissipated if the long and short positions were held for too long after 
portfolio formation. 
 
The discovery of Momentum has led to an increasing amount of research on the subject 
matter. Momentum as a phenomenon causes a serious challenge to the EMH as no 
existing asset-pricing model has been able to explain the source of Momentum profits. 
Chan, Jegadeesh & Lakonishkok (1996) revisited the possibility of Momentum 
originating from an underreaction to price information involving stocks, especially an 
underreaction to past earnings announcements. Chan et al. argued that the build-up of 
Momentum was similar to the underreactions that build up post-earnings announcement 
drift (PEAD) and thus could be explained by the same logic. This underreaction 
hypothesis was the first prospective behavioral explanation for Momentum returns. 
 
Chan et al. (1996) indeed found that approximately 41% of Momentum’s returns within 
the holding period of the portfolio came around company earnings announcements, 
which indicates similar underreactions that are found in PEAD. However, some part of 
the remaining roughly 59% of the returns may have come from underreactions to other 
types of announcements, such as: stock buybacks, insider trading and new equity issues. 
The evident drifts in the stock prices however indicate a very realistic probability of an 
underreacting market. 
 
In conclusion to their study, Chan et al. (1996) however find that the variables in their 
study, which included past earnings announcements, weren’t reliable in predicting 
future returns for Momentum. The evidence of their study was sufficient however to 
suggest that Momentum strategies are affected to some extent by underreaction to 
different pieces of information. The question thus remains: can underreactions be a 
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reliable explanation for Momentum returns if they cannot predict the returns themselves 
even if they can partly account for them? Then again, explaining the source of the 
returns and predicting future returns may indeed be two very different things when it 
comes to Momentum returns. 
 
Rouwenhorst (1998) was one of the earliest researchers to examine Momentum outside 
of the U.S. He contributed further evidence that Momentum either can’t be captured by 
asset-pricing models or is the result of underreaction by markets, or both. His evidence 
backs the claim that Momentum does in fact, provide abnormal returns in other 
countries besides the United States. Rouwenhorst finds that the evidence he collected 
from European countries is very similar to the results that Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) 
originally found in the United States. Rouwenhorst suggests that these results indicate 
that country specific Momentum is relatively unimportant in explaining the underlying 
causes for Momentum. 
 
Rouwenhorst continued to investigate the profitability of Momentum out-of-sample in 
1999, when he examined Momentum returns in emerging markets. Rouwenhorst again 
uses international markets in his study to provide further evidence, independent of the 
U.S., that Momentum could be found in other countries as well. Rouwenhorst 
rationalizes the use of emerging markets in his study by claiming that emerging markets 
function in relative isolation from the biggest capital markets in the world, thus 
providing good independent samples as many emerging markets had only just began 
lifting restrictions on investments by foreign investors. In his study Rouwenhorst finds 
that the return factors of Momentum have distinct local character to them: the 
correlation between emerging markets is relatively low and the exposure to global risk 
factors do not explain their average returns. Rouwenhorst’s study is however, subject to 
two important biases: the indices he used to gather data mostly consisted of larger and 
frequently traded stocks in emerging markets. This means that the Momentum effect 
might have either been diluted or enhanced, depending on the way Momentum 
commoves with volume and size in emerging markets. The conclusion of the study is 
that the evidence concerning correlations suggests that the cross-sectional differences 
between expected returns are primarily driven by local factors. Thus adding to the 
evidence that Momentum is not dependent on a unifying global risk factor. 
 
Chan, Hameed & Tong contribute to the study of Momentum in out-of-sample settings 
with their 2000 study “Profitability of Momentum Strategies in the International Equity 
Markets”. Their work investigates three things: whether country selection is useful in 
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applying Momentum strategies to country indices, how exchange rate movements affect 
the profitability of Momentum and whether trading volume affects the profitability of 
Momentum internationally. The rationales for these research questions provide further 
insight into the robustness of the Momentum phenomena. As access to foreign equity 
markets increasingly becomes available to international equity funds, the question of 
whether country selection affects Momentum returns in indices is highly relevant. The 
effect that exchange rate appreciations and depreciations can have on a Momentum 
portfolio returns might be significant and reduce returns to the anomaly in an 
international setting. Lastly it is relevant to discern whether trading volume has an 
effect on Momentum returns in an international setting as it seemingly does in the 
traditional samples in the United States. 
 
Chan et al. (2000) find that greater trading volume does indeed affect Momentum 
returns positively, as is the case in the U.S. This finding is in accordance with earlier 
studies that investigated the relation of trading volume and Momentum. In addition, 
Chan et al. find that exchange rates play no significant role in Momentum returns and 
more specifically, it doesn’t have a negative effect. As a final result, Chan et al. find 
more evidence to back the claim that Momentum returns aren’t confined to developed 
countries only, but instead are evident in emerging markets as well, lending to the 
explanation that country selection doesn’t have a huge difference in the profitability of 
Momentum. In their work Chan et al. also analyzed their results separately for the 
winner and loser portfolios and saw that the loser portfolios effect on the total returns of 
Momentum were either insignificant or contributed negatively in their sample. This is a 
finding that could be affected by country specific circumstances when employing 
Momentum internationally. 
 
Jegadeesh & Titman (2001) evaluate alternative explanations for Momentum profits. 
Their work backs the claim that Momentum returns continued in the 1990’s and thus 
weren’t a result of data snooping bias as was suggested based on the sample they used 
in their original study. The continuing anomalous returns from Momentum in the 
subsequent eight years after Jegadeesh and Titman’s first discovery also suggests that 
investors have not altered their investment strategies in a way that would have 
eliminated Momentum returns from the market. Jegadeesh and Titman also examined 
whether Momentum profits could stem from delayed overreactions that eventually 
reverse instead of underreactions as they first proposed.  
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In addition to providing further evidence for the robustness of Momentum, Jegadeesh & 
Titman (2001) also investigated why return reversals happen in the post-holding 
periods. They found that post-holding period returns are affected by the sample of the 
study, the sample period, and in some cases whether the post-holding period returns are 
risk-adjusted. Noteworthy is also the case that if post-holding periods become long 
enough, then we begin to see a contrarian effect similar to the one described by 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985). The unstable realization of post-holding period return 
reversals suggests that behavioral explanations of Momentum cannot account for the 
anomalous returns by themselves. This indicates that in reality the best explanations for 
Momentum returns lie somewhere between behavioral models and models of market 
efficiency. 
 
Griffin, Ji & Martin (2003) examine the effect of macroeconomic risks in explaining 
Momentum returns globally. They find that Momentum returns commove only weakly 
among 40 countries, which suggests that if there is a macroeconomic risk factor that 
explains Momentum, it isn’t global but country specific. Griffin et al. also find that the 
Chen, Roll & Ross (1986) multifactor model – which consists of macroeconomic 
factors - doesn’t produce significant results in explaining pricing or time series in 
Momentum profits in 17 countries. A third finding by Griffin et al. supports the findings 
of Chan et al. (2000) in that internationally, winner portfolios earn greater returns than 
loser portfolios. The fourth finding of the study provides evidence that Momentum 
returns aren’t affected by macroeconomic states and if anything, Momentum returns are 
slightly higher in negative market cycles. Griffin et al. arrived at this conclusion through 
comparisons between Momentum portfolio returns in different economic climates 
determined by GDP growth and aggregate stock market movements. This is to say that 
Momentum returns aren’t rewards for bearing business cycle risk. Griffin et al. deduce 
that Momentum returns cannot be explained by the macroeconomic variables used in 
their study. This does not however mean that macroeconomic variables aren’t a part of 
the explanation for Momentum returns, they just aren’t the ones used by Griffin et al. 
Finally, Griffin et al. provide further evidence that Momentum returns undergo a 
reversal when holding periods last for one to five years. This finding is consistent with 
the original discoveries of price reversals by DeBondt & Thaler (1985). 
 
In 2006 Antoniou, Lam & Paudyal investigate whether business cycle variables and 
behavioral biases can explain Momentum returns in three major European markets: UK, 
Germany and France. Their study incorporates risk-based and behavioral variables in a 
two-stage model to explain Momentum returns in three European equity markets. 
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Antoniou et al. find that Momentum could be explained to a certain extent by asset 
mispricing that is closely linked to global business cycles and is unlikely to be 
explained by behavioral variables that they used in their study. The results of the study 
don’t indicate a clear role for the behavioral variables according to Antoniou et al. and 
this in turn supposedly suggests that investor behavior is less likely to be correlated with 
business cycles. The study also includes the caveat that business cycle risk cannot fully 
explain Momentum profits, but that it may explain a share of them. This is in 
contradiction to Griffin et al. (2003) who claimed that Momentum returns are not 
affected by business cycles.  
 
Chui, Titman & Wei (2010) investigate the effect that cultural differences in different 
countries may have on Momentum returns. These cultural differences were measured by 
a global personality index created by Hofstede (2001), who is originally a psychologist, 
not an academic in the field of finance. The link between the personality index and 
studying Momentum comes from the assertion that individuality – which is one of the 
personality traits measured by the index – is correlated with the original behavioral 
biases related to Momentum: overconfidence and attribution bias. Chui et al. show 
independent support for the idea that overconfidence appears more often in 
individualistic cultures by displaying that individualism is correlated with trading 
volume and volatility. Judging by this, the whole study depends on the original idea that 
individuality is correlated with overconfidence. This is a rather big assumption to base 
results upon and in the case that these assumptions are false, all the results of the study 
come into question in respect to their validity. Chui et al. further argue in their premise 
that individualism – based on the personality index – is related to the kind of 
overconfidence discussed in Momentum literature. This is another assumption that this 
study relies on. It is possible that individualism – as defined originally in Hofstede’s 
work in the field of psychology – isn’t correlated at all with the concept of 
overconfidence as it’s been used in the Momentum literature. As a final point, the 
argument of Chui et al. relies even further on the premise that overconfidence does in 
fact explain Momentum returns, which it hasn’t been distinctly shown to do. 
 
 Chui et al. (2010) however find that their results suggest that Momentum profits 
increase along with the individualism index. At the very least this is self-evident 
evidence for the positive correlation between Momentum and individuality measured by 
Hofstede’s (2001) index. However, all other possible conclusions are reliant on the 
aforementioned assumptions to be true. Regardless of the conclusions based on the 
results, Chui et al. offer other interesting conclusions such as the challenge of risk-based 
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models to explain why Momentum returns are high in the United States and Europe, but 
not in Japan and most of East-Asia. The challenge on the other hand for behavioral 
models is to explain why individuals in some countries are prone to the psychological 
biases that cause Momentum, and in some countries they aren’t. Following the logic of 
the previous conclusion, Chui et al. offer up a final conclusion on their work which 
suggests that Momentum returns are less evident in Japan and East-Asia because these 
geographical areas are less individualistic and people in less individualistic countries 
tend to rely on the opinions of their peers. This means that they are less overconfident 
and thus don’t make investment decisions that generate Momentum. 
 
Novy-Marx (2012) finds evidence that Momentum cannot actually be described through 
the tendency for prices to stay in motion. In his 2011 work, Novy-Marx presents results 
that indicate the shortcomings of applying Momentum on the basis of recent returns. 
According to Novy-Marx, strategies that are based on recent returns do generate 
positive returns, but are less profitable than strategies based on intermediate past 
returns. These results aren’t strictly new findings, as Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) 
already found the J/K strategy of 12/3 to be the most profitable. Novy-Marx suggests 
that his findings are inconsistent with the traditional view of Momentum, in that 
winners keep winning and losers keep losing. This is to say that Momentum isn’t in fact 
momentum and that intermediate past returns are the driving factor in the Momentum 
anomaly. As such the findings of these results don’t seem to have implications for 
Momentum as a whole. However, these findings propose serious difficulties for 
behavioral models that try to explain the origins of Momentum returns. Especially the 
behavioral models contending that Momentum is the result of underreactions – prices 
slowly adjusting to information – are called into serious question, as the auto-correlation 
link between recent and intermediate returns seems to be contradictory to the data. It is 
important to notice that even though Novy-Marx goes on to demonstrate the lack of 
auto-correlation – the lack of a link – between recent and intermediate returns, he or no 
one else for that matter can explain why these intermediate returns cause Momentum 
profits. As such, the work of Novy-Marx offers insight into what doesn’t constitute 
Momentum returns, but not into what does.   
 
Fama and French (2012) investigate whether asset-pricing models could explain 
Momentum returns and whether asset pricing is integrated across markets. In the four 
regions Fama and French investigate, they find Momentum returns in North America, 
Europe and Asia Pacific but none in Japan. These returns seem to diminish when firm 
size grows from small to large. In further results Fama and French conclude that 
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integrated pricing across regions is unlikely to be a reality in stock markets and the 
asset-pricing models used in the study cannot duly explain Momentum returns in the 
sample regions. 
 
In their work Fama and French (2012) also critique the work of Chui et al. (2010) in 
that they disagree with the assertion that Japan doesn’t present Momentum because of 
the cultures individuality. Fama and French propose that the conclusion could be 
reversed in that low individuality could produce Momentum in inherent slow price 
reactions to information. This seems to suggest that implicitly Fama and French believe 
to a certain extent in the underreaction theory as a partial explanation at least to 
Momentum returns.  
 
Interaction patterns between certain stock level characteristics and Momentum returns 
have been used as a basis for some behavioral explanations of Momentum (Bandarchuk 
& Hilscher, 2012). Bandarchuk and Hilscher provide evidence in their work that these 
characteristics (size, R2, turnover, age, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, 
market-to-book, price, illiquidity, credit rating) simply proxy for extreme past returns in 
stocks. These findings propose that explanations for Momentum need not be due to 
these behavioral assumptions based on characteristics but rather simply due to extreme 
past returns. Behavioral explanations of Momentum have enlisted characteristic screens 
in constructing superior Momentum strategies prior to Bandarchuk and Hilscher’s work. 
However, Bandarchuk & Hilscher show that the positive effect of characteristic screens 
in Momentum strategies disappear when they are controlled for volatility and extreme 
past returns. Characteristics enhance Momentum returns only because stocks with 
extreme characteristics tend to have extreme past returns and extreme past returns result 
in higher Momentum returns. As a result, Bandarchuk & Hilscher suggest that the 
explanation for Momentum has to begin with discerning the link between volatility, past 
returns and Momentum.  
  
Asness, Moskowitz & Pedersen (2013) find abnormal Momentum and value returns 
across eight different markets and asset classes (table 1). Asness et al. also find negative 
correlation between value and Momentum. Asness et al. incorporate a joint approach to 
studying Momentum returns. Most studies on the international prevalence of 
Momentum study sample markets in isolation from the rest of the world. Asness et al. 
suggest that their approach answers important questions: how much variation exists 
between Momentum returns across markets and asset classes, how correlated 
Momentum returns are across markets and asset classes with different geographies, 
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structure, investor types and securities, what are the economic drivers of Momentum 
and what’s the correlation structure like and what is a natural benchmark portfolio for 
global securities across asset classes? Asness et al. also investigate these 
aforementioned questions in context to value, but most of this is out of scope for this 
thesis and will be mentioned only when deemed relevant. 
 
Asness et al. (2013) discover a wide array of results in their work out of which the most 
striking results come from the discovery of co-movement between value and 
Momentum across asset classes. Value and Momentum strategies are positively 
correlated with other value and Momentum strategies across different markets. Asness 
et al. suggest that this co-movement is indicative of a common global risk factor that 
works towards explaining returns for both strategies. Regardless of this indication it 
seems that separate factors for value and Momentum best explain their respective 
returns when the strategies negative correlation is taken into account. If indeed a 
common global risk factor could explain the returns for both value and Momentum, it 
would seem possible that asset-pricing models with value factors would have done a 
better job of explaining Momentum returns in earlier studies already. Asness et al. do 
delve further into the explanatory link between value and Momentum and discern that 
the link between these two is mostly related to liquidity risk and that this risk’s 
importance has increased over time. This seems to be a new discovery as this result can 
be inferred only from looking across various markets simultaneously instead from 
isolated sample country studies. In terms of its explanatory power however, funding risk 
may only explain a fraction of value and Momentum returns. Even more interesting is 
the fact that combining value and Momentum evenly as an investment strategy negates 
this liquidity risk and still provides positive abnormal returns. In conclusion, Asness et 
al. suggest studying value and Momentum as a combination since the mixture of these 
two are much closer to the efficient frontier than either investment strategy by 
themselves, which is evident in figure 1 especially in the case of stocks. 
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Table 1. The percentages represent average raw excess (of the 1-month U.S. T-
bill) returns and the numbers within the parentheses are their t-statistics. P1, 
P2 and P3 are portfolios constructed on low, medium and high Momentum 
respectively. (Asness et al., 2013) 
Figure 1. Cumulative returns to portfolios based on value, Momentum and a 50/50 split of 
both. The sample countries and/or continents listed under “Global” include the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Europe and Japan. (Asness et al., 2013) 
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Asness, Frazzini, Israel & Moskowitz (2014) have one of the most recent working 
papers discussing tweaks to the traditional Momentum strategy and presenting cases for 
the risk-based vs. behavioral argument over Momentum’s returns. Asness et al. in the 
same vein as Barroso & Santa Clara (2015) suggest a modified version of the 
Momentum strategy to minimize risk, especially crash risk. The difference being that 
Asness et al. propose combining Momentum (UMD) with value (HML) to form a split 
portfolio of the two. In the data Asness et al. used, Momentum’s largest negative returns 
were -77 % and values’ -43 % at their most extremes in the time period sample. 
Combining the two into one portfolio however delivered only -30 % negative returns at 
its most extreme. Combining these two factors will give investors minimized negative 
returns and higher positive returns during extreme times, such as crashes, when 
compared to using both factors by themselves. The value/Momentum investment 
strategy is another modification to the traditional Momentum strategy that might lead to 
the utilization of a superior investment strategy. Whenever risk can be managed at the 
expense of higher returns - which sounds contradictory to the traditional view of risk 
and return – there will be interest in applying these sorts of strategies.   
 
Asness et al. (2014) present a wide and up-to-date discussion on the already well-
established argument over whether risk-based models can explain Momentum or 
whether it’s a behavioral phenomenon. The consensus seems to be that both sides of the 
argument provide important insight in explaining Momentum’s returns and why its 
premiums continue to persist. 
 
In discussing the behavioral models underlying Momentum, Asness et al. (2014) 
recount the typical explanations of underreactions – even though they seem to be 
refuted by Novy-Marx (2012) – and delayed overreactions being responsible for  
Momentum. Underreactions suggest that information affects stock prices slowly and 
overreactions rely on investors chasing returns, leading to cyclical amplification, or a 
feedback mechanism, driving prices higher. 
 
The risk-based view sees the Momentum premium as being compensation for risk 
(Asness et al., 2014), the idea however being that this risk factor is yet to be discovered 
and therefore the anomaly persists. The most recent models suggest that this 
undiscovered risk factor relates to economic risks that affect firm investment and long-
term cash flows and dividends through growth rates. This is similar to the two new risk 
factors in the FF5 (Fama & French, 2014). The underlying mechanism here is that high-
momentum stocks are affected by greater cash-flow risk due to their growth possibilities 
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or that they face greater discount rate risk due to their investment horizons causing them 
to face higher costs for capital. In conclusion to their work Asness et al. propose that the 
Momentum anomaly will persist – regardless of the explanatory point of view – as long 
as risks and tastes for risks don’t change and as long as biases, behaviors and limits to 
arbitrage remain stable. Table 2 summarizes the different prospective explanations for 
Momentum. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. A table summarizing the different prospective 
explanations for Momentum returns as suggested by 
different academics. 
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The previous paragraphs gave an overview of the history and evolution of Momentum. 
Since its discovery in 1993 by Jegadeesha & Titman, numerous studies have been 
conducted on Momentum. The rest of this chapter will discuss different aspects of 
implementing the strategy. The purpose is to shed light on different studies that have 
researched the returns of the many versions of Momentum out there and display the 
effectiveness of applying Momentum and its variations as a profitable investment 
strategy. 
 
The Momentum strategy essentially has two parts to it, the formation period (J) and the 
holding period (K) (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). The formation period is a recent to 
intermediate past time period where data on the success of stocks is gathered. This data 
is used to rank stocks – usually into deciles – from worst to best performance. Then the 
top performers are bought long, while the worst performers are sold short for an 
intermediate time period, known as the holding period. 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman test 32 different Momentum strategies in their original work. The 
first 16 strategies consist of combinations of three, six, nine and twelve-month 
formation and holding periods. The second set of 16 strategies are the same as the first 
with the exception of having a week between formation and holding periods in order to 
avoid bid-ask spread bounce, price pressure and lagged reactions that might distort the 
evidence. Jegadeesh and Titman divided up the companies into equal weight decile 
portfolios according to performance. The top performers were the winners and the worst 
ones the losers. Each month, they bought the winner portfolio and sold the loser 
portfolio for K months. The results for all the employed strategies are presented in table 
3. (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993) 
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The most successful portfolio in the original Momentum study is the one with a 
formation period of 12 months and a holding period of 3 months (Jegadeesh & Titman, 
1993). This strategy yielded an average monthly return of 1.31 % without a week in 
between periods and 1.49 % with a week in between the periods as can be seen in table 
3. Converted to yearly returns, this would compound into 16.9 % and 19.4 % 
respectively. Every strategy that Jegadeesh and Titman investigate results in statistically 
significant abnormal returns except for the J/K strategy of three and three months. The 
J/K strategy of six and six months that Jegadeesh & Titman analyze the most realizes 
excess returns of 12.01 % per year on average. 
 
Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) also take into consideration the turnover rate for their 
Momentum strategies, as it is clear that with short and intermediate holding periods, 
there is going to be fluctuations in the contents of the portfolios. On average they find 
that semiannually the turnover rate was 84.8 %, which as a percentage is high compared 
to most portfolios and investment strategies. In addition to turnover rates, Jegadeesh and 
Table 3. Monthly average return for Momentum strategies where J represents the formation period duration 
in months and K represents the holding period duration in months. Panel A does not include a week in 
between formation and holding periods, whereas Panel B does. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
(Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993) 
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Titman consider what effect transaction costs would have as a result of high turnover. 
They consider a 0.5 % one-way transaction cost per year and adjusted the yearly returns 
of the most common form of the strategy to that cost. They find that even with a 0.5 % 
one-way transaction cost, yearly returns would be 9.29 %. These risk-adjusted returns 
after transaction costs are still statistically significant. 
 
In inspecting the profitability of Momentum, Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) also consider 
seasonality and its effects on returns. January has typically had a positive effect on 
returns in the stock market. For example, January returns on portfolios based on value 
have historically had tremendous returns that are often seen as anomalous. Momentum 
returns during January however deliver on average -7 % returns. This negative monthly 
effect seems to be restricted to January only, as every other month results in positive 
abnormal returns. In the sample Jegadeesh and Titman use, Momentum realized positive 
returns in 67 % of the months. This percentage increases to 71 % when January months 
are excluded from the sample. The average return for non-January months amount to 
1.66 %. Jegadeesh & Titman also provide further evidence to the finding that the size of 
negative January Momentum returns is inversely correlated with firm size. 
 
January wasn’t the only month that seemed to highlight Momentum returns in some 
way. Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) found that returns were rather low in August whereas 
they were fairly high in April, November and December. The monthly differences 
outside of January were also found to be statistically significant for the whole sample. 
April in particular seemed to have a strong effect on Momentum returns. 24 out of 25 
Aprils (96 %) produced positive Momentum monthly returns on average of 3.33 %. A 
possible explanation to the consistently positive returns of April may lie in tax 
deductions. Corporations must transfer money to their pension funds before April. 
Pension fund portfolio managers may then invest this money into assets. If the portfolio 
managers follow price momentum in any way, this may add to the price pressure of 
stocks during the month of April. The significant returns of November and December 
may benefit from similar price pressure associated with selling losers before years’ end 
for tax or window dressing related reasons. 
 
The 1999 study by Rouwenhorst that investigated Momentum returns in emerging 
markets is based on a different kind of Momentum strategy than that of Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). In Rouwenhorst’s strategy stocks are ranked by their past six-month 
performance, after which the top and bottom five percent are disregarded and then the 
stocks are compiled not into deciles, but three groups: winners (top 30%), average 
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(middle 30%) and losers (bottom 30%). The holding period however, is again six 
months. 
 
Chan et al. (2000) provide an interesting variation to Momentum strategies not only in 
that they long or short indices instead of individual stocks, but because in their results 
most countries exhibit greatest excess returns for two week holding periods. This 
seemingly contradicts the typically regarded most profitable J/K strategy of 12/3 months 
or the most commonly investigated J/K strategy of 6/6 months for that matter. 
 
Grundy & Martin (2001) propose their own variation on using Momentum as an 
investment strategy. They argue that a Momentum strategy - which bases its formation 
of winner and loser portfolios on total returns - is outperformed by a portfolio based on 
stock-specific return components. Grundy & Martin formed portfolios by stock-specific 
return components and claim that their evidence is strongly in favor of this approach 
being more profitable. 
 
Novy-Marx (2012) echoes Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) to a certain extent in suggesting 
intermediate past returns to be more profitable in Momentum strategies. Jegadeesh and 
Titman find that the most profitable J/K strategy is 12/3 and Novy-Marx agrees in that 
seven to 12 months’ past returns should be considered. Novy-Marx suggests that 
investors should disregard anything under seven months and everything over 12 months 
when assessing past returns as this reduces the Momentum strategies performance. 
According to Novy-Marx the profitability of Momentum increases by ignoring recent 
performance and this is especially the case in large liquid stocks, which seem to exhibit 
more Momentum. The increased Sharpe ratio due to ignoring recent performance isn’t 
only limited to stocks. Other strategies that trade industries, investment styles, 
international equity indices, commodities and currencies all exhibit the advantages of 
ignoring recent performance. Industry momentums is discussed in greater depth later on 
in this thesis. 
 
Bandarchuk & Hilscher (2012) propose their own considerations for superior 
Momentums strategies. Based on their findings, Bandarchuk & Hilscher suggest that it 
is best to avoid any kind of characteristic screens when evaluating stocks to be included 
in Momentum portfolios. This means that focusing purely on past returns is sufficient in 
applying Momentum as an investment strategy. 
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Asness et al.’s (2014) variation of the Momentum strategy, which was discussed earlier, 
combines value (HML) and Momentum (UMD) into a single portfolio. Asness et al. 
find that the optimal ratio of value and Momentum in a portfolio is 60 % and 40 % 
respectively. This Momentum strategy that combines value and Momentum reduces the 
negative returns of Momentum crashes and provides higher returns compared to 
employing a strictly value based or strictly Momentum based investment strategy. See 
table 4 for further detail on the combinatory portfolio of value and Momentum. 
   
 
Even though Momentum has been studied widely after its discovery by Jegadeesh and 
Titman in 1993, the typical Momentum strategies employed are mostly similar to the 
ones presented in the original paper. The most these strategies are manipulated pertains 
to differing the formation and holding periods or including or excluding the most recent 
month in the formation period. The most interesting developments to Momentum 
strategies are recent in nature and the value/Momentum combination (Asness at al., 
2014) along with risk-managed Momentum (Barroso & Santa Clara 2015), which will 
be discussed later, are papers that introduce something fundamentally new to 
Momentum. 
 
Regardless of most Momentum strategies closely resembling each other, there are 
discrepancies between best practices in implementing Momentum strategies that seem 
to rise while inspecting different samples utilized for empirical tests of the anomaly. 
This serves as a cautioning note, that not every strategy should or can be implemented 
in e.g. each country or each class of security. Some of these contradictions that exist in 
Momentum strategies are discussed below. 
 
Grundy & Martin (2001) propose that transaction costs cause a decline in Momentum 
returns resulting in a degree of ineffectiveness in Momentum investing. Asness et al. 
(2014) on the other hand claim to refute the argument that transaction costs cause any 
Table 4. Sharpe ratios, 1-year rolling returns and 5-year rolling returns expressed as percentages over the 
time period 1927-2013. Portfolios include the market portfolio (RMRF), size portfolio (SMB), value portfolio 
(HML), Momentum portfolio (UMD) and value/Momentum portfolio based on a respective 60/40 split 
(HML/UMD). (Asness et al., 2014) 
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significant ineffectiveness to the strategy. Being separated by 13 years, these differences 
in views could be attributed to revised samples and research that in fact overturn the 
evidence of Grundy and Martin. Perhaps the ineffectiveness that Grundy and Martin 
discuss in their papers is the same kind that Asness et al. (2014) describe as 
insignificant ineffectiveness. This could also reconcile these two points of views. Yet 
another point to consider is the fact that transaction costs in general have undergone a 
tremendous decrease in the era of computerized trading, which has blossomed during 
the very time period separating these two studies. 
 
Another juxtaposition in evidence seemingly comes from the work of Antoniou et al. 
(2006) and Griffin et al. (2003). Antoniou et al. suggest that business cycle risk could 
explain Momentum profits to a certain extent through asset-pricing models. Griffin et 
al. however find in their study that business cycle risk doesn’t explain Momentum 
returns and if anything, Momentum returns are larger in bear markets. Whether these 
results are incidental or regardless reconcilable, is hard to tell. For example, Antoniou et 
al. could be correct in that asset-pricing models may for instance explain the 
incrementally higher Momentum returns in bear markets that Griffin et al. allude to. 
Even if this were the case, the marginal explanatory power of business cycle risk could 
still be relatively low and wouldn’t account for proper conducive explanations for 
Momentum.  
 
More contradictory evidence to the successful applications of Momentum in several 
stock markets comes again from Antoniou et al. (2006), Griffin et al. (2003) and Chan 
et al. (2000). Antoniou et al. find that loser portfolios account for the greater share of 
profits from Momentum portfolios in their sample and that this is the case in general 
with Momentum. Griffin et al. and Chan et al. however find the exact opposite in that 
winners, instead of losers, account for most profits in Momentum. Antoniou et al. look 
at only three countries in their sample, whereas Griffin et al. and Chan et al. have much 
larger samples. This could be an indication that in general, Griffin et al. and Chan et al. 
are correct in their assumptions as they have a more representative sample in their 
studies. 
 
Index based Momentum strategies and stock based Momentum strategies are another 
puzzle. Countries that appear as top performers in index based Momentum strategies 
come out as bottom performers in stock based Momentum strategies (Chui et al., 2010; 
Griffin et al., 2003; Chan et al., 2000; Rouwenhorst 1999). This reverse effect is 
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intriguing and quite frankly, hard to explain without further studies conducted into the 
matter.  
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5. INDUSTRY MOMENTUM 
Understanding previous research conducted on industry Momentum is an obvious 
prerequisite to advancing to further chapters in this thesis. This part will thus focus on 
expanding on the previous research as well as indicating how profitable industry 
Momentum has been in the past. 
5.1. Previous Research 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) were the first to investigate the existence of 
Momentum payoffs related to industry portfolios. Their article as such did not 
investigate the absolute or relative profitability of Momentum investing, but rather as 
many articles before it sought to determine the actual source of these profits. The idea 
that Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) set forth was that abnormal returns from ordinary 
stock Momentum could actually be attributed to Momentum within industries.  
 
As with regular stock Momentum, the returns to industry Momentum exhibit 
statistically significant positive returns after controlling for size and book-to-market. 
However, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) add individual stock Momentum, 
microstructural influences, and cross-sectional dispersion in mean returns to the control 
variables and still find that industry Momentum returns are significant. In addition to 
the results being significant, the overall profitability of industry Momentum actually 
surpasses that of individual stock Momentum according to their study. Additionally, 
unlike most individual stock Momentum strategies according to Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz, the majority of industry Momentum profits come from the long side of the 
strategy as opposed to the short. Another difference between individual stock 
Momentum and industry Momentum comes from the profitability in terms of time 
horizons for holding the portfolios. Industry Momentum is at its most profitable at the 
one-month period according to Grinblatt & Moskowitz.  
 
For their data Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) use Compustat and the CRSP database to 
form 20 value-weighted industry portfolios based on their two-digit SIC codes that 
come from stocks listed in NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq. Their time period spans from 
1963 to 1995. This setup is similar to the one used in many of the industry Momentum 
articles and thus similar to the setup that will be used in this thesis. With 20 industry 
portfolios Grinblatt and Moskowitz have an average of 230 stocks per industry which 
satisfies requirements for being well diversified. 
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Even though Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) find that industry Momentum is at its 
most profitable with the one-month horizon, they focus much of their analysis on the 
J/K strategy of six and six, just like the original study by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
Their methodology both skips and includes the latest month in different analyses and 
rebalances monthly so that they long the highest 30 % of value-weighted stocks and 
short the lowest 30 % of value-weighted stocks. The implementation of the top and 
bottom 30 % strategies differs from the original decile sort used by Jegadeesh and 
Titman, which, as the name suggests, goes long into the top 10 % and shorts the bottom 
10 % of stocks based on historical performance. Regardless, the results for industry 
Momentum are similar to individual stock Momentum as described by Jegadeesh and 
Titman, in that profits are strong within holding periods of 3 to 12 months, but if held 
longer, diminish with time and undergo a similar reversal as described by DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985). 
 
Individual industries exert patterns in Grinblatt and Moskowitz’ (1999) research. For 
instance, Food & Beverage appears in the winner portfolio 23 % percent, or 80 months, 
of the time. In the same vein, the loser portfolio exhibits patterns as well. Fabricated 
Metals appears in the shorted portfolio 83 times. Even though the absolute number of 
months for these examples are high, the maximum number of consecutive appearances 
any industry has in either portfolio is five, which – according to Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz – indicates that no single industry portfolio dominates either of the 
portfolios. 
 
Overall Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) find a persistent Momentum effect in 
industries that cannot be explained by what they refer to as microstructure effects, 
cross-sectional mean dispersion in returns, or individual stock Momentum. In fact, 
industry Momentums subsumes individual stock Momentum at all horizons except the 
12-month one and the authors claim that this subsuming effect and thus industry 
Momentum explains individual stock Momentum returns almost entirely.  Regardless of 
this subsuming effect industry Momentum still attains most of its profits from the long 
side as opposed to individual stock Momentum. Additionally, industry Momentum also 
attains most of its profits from large liquid stocks, which again is in juxtaposition to 
individual stock Momentum. Even though, the authors make a case for explaining that 
individual stock Momentum returns are explained by industry Momentum and that 
industry Momentum is profitable, they offer up no real explanations as to why 
industries have this effect. They are instead content with conjecturing that this effect 
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might be due to investors herding to (from) hot (cold) sectors in the economy and thus 
creating price pressure. 
 
Grundy and Martin (2001) follow-up on Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) and delve 
deeper into the risks and sources of returns surrounding Momentum. An important 
finding, they make is that Momentum has been largely stable in the post-1926 time-
period when exposed to existing time-varying factors in the stock market. At the time of 
Grundy and Martins study, different factor models could explain about 95% of the 
variability of Momentum’s returns, but couldn’t explain the mean returns from 
employing Momentum. This distinction is very important, as the mean returns are 
specifically the anomalous component in Momentum. In the same study Grundy and 
Martin investigate whether industry risk or cross-sectional differences in returns have a 
positive effect on Momentum build up. They however conclude that neither of these are 
the primary cause for Momentum returns. 
 
Grundy & Martin’s (2001) conclusions suggest that Momentum doesn’t provide 
arbitrage opportunities relying on the evidence that the risk-adjusted hedged total 
returns for Momentum are negative in 261 months out of a total of 828. Grundy and 
Martin also view unaccounted transaction costs as a possible explanation for the 1.3% 
monthly anomalous returns. Finally, Grundy and Martin go on to suggest that if the 
Momentum anomaly does not die out, it will sooner or later become a factor comparable 
to SMB and HML which properties are well understood. 
 
The next top publication concerning industry Momentum after the original Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz (1999) and Grundy and Martin (2001) paper was authored by Nijman, 
Swinkels and Verbeek in 2004. Their paper focused on investigating whether either 
countries or industries or both can explain Momentum returns. Nijman et al. (2004) 
received results from their study that take a rather opposite view to the findings 
presented by Grinblatt and Moskowitz. The conclude that Momentum in Europe is 
explained by individual stock effects and not by industry wide effects and even less so, 
by country specific effects. The Nijman et al. study serves as a first out-of-sample test 
for Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) with the analysis focusing on countries outside the 
U.S., which was the center of research for the original industry Momentum effect. 
 
Nijman et al. (2004) use 10 of data from 1990 to 2000, which is a drastically smaller 
timeframe than what Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) use. For this time period they use 
a portfolio-based regression technique which makes it possible for the authors to 
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determine, which of the effects is most important in explaining excess returns and they 
find that individual Momentum components account for roughly 60 % of the effect, 
whereas industry and country specific effects account for 30 % and 10 % respectively. 
Additionally, the authors claim that controlling for value and size effects in the model 
confirms that individual Momentum effects dominate industry and country Momentum 
effects.  
 
In their paper Nijman et al. (2004) focus on large European stocks, as they claim that 
data for small European firms is not reliably available. This may run the risk of 
introducing a confirmation bias in the data, as Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) note that 
large stocks tend to exhibit more Momentum in industries as a whole. Thus, if Nijman 
et al. were to include smaller stocks, this might reduce their findings on the power of 
industry Momentum in European stocks. In addition to being larger European stocks, 
the authors require each stock to be covered by analysts from Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) and to have data on their prior 6-month return, market value, and 
book-to-market ratio. Their total sample thus consists of 1581 stocks, where the least 
amount of stocks per country is 33 for Ireland and the most is 349 for the U.K. The rest 
of the countries included in the study are: Denmark, France, Sweden, Finland, Spain, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Portugal, Belgium and Austria. 
 
Classifying stocks into industries differs in Nijman et al. (2004) from Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz (1999) as SIC industry codes aren’t available for stocks in Europe. Thus, 
Nijman et al. use MSCI classifications, which leads them to use 23 different industries 
which differs from the Grinblatt and Moskowitz study in the amount and composition. 
This leads to a range of 9 to 260 stocks per industry, where 10 out of 23 industries 
contain less than 50 stocks while 4 have more than 100. 
 
Nijman et al. (2004) follow a similar portfolio construction method as Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999). They form individual, country and 
industry Momentum portfolios all of which they utilize in their study. The industry 
Momentum portfolios are formed so that four industries end up in the winner portfolio 
and four in the loser portfolio. This leaves 15 industries in the middle of the ranking that 
are excluded. The winners and losers are determined according to prior 6-month returns 
and are held for a further 6 months. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly and held for 
the entirety of the holding period. The method is much the same as in Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz (1999) with the exception of different portfolio rankings in terms of 
percentiles.  
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To conclude Nijman et al.’s (2004) study, they find evidence that industry Momentum 
does not explain individual stock Momentum in Europe, which is directly in opposition 
to what Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) report for the U.S. Additionally, they find that 
the role of industry Momentum in explaining overall Momentum returns is 
economically significant, but not statistically so.  
 
Pan, Liano and Huang (2004) published a paper analyzing the sources of profits for 
industry Momentum. More specifically, they investigate whether industry Momentum 
profits may be decomposed into own-autocorrelations, cross-autocorrelations and cross-
sectional dispersion in mean returns and which of the aforementioned play the most 
important part in explaining returns. Pan et al. essentially build off of the conclusions of 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) in that industry Momentum subsumes individual stock 
Momentum and thus they try and discern the origins of industry Momentum returns. As 
a result, they do not set forth any theories or findings to contradict Nijman et al.’s 
(2004) proposition that the relationship between individual stock and industry 
Momentum would be reversed. Indeed, if the assumptions of Grinblatt and Moskowitz – 
and further accepted by Pan et al. – hold true, in that industry Momentum subsumes 
individual stock Momentum, then risk-managed Momentum (Barroso & Santa Clara, 
2015) may produce similar results for industries. Conversely, if the opposite is true for 
risk-managed Momentum, then one might conjecture that individual stock and industry 
Momentum stem from different origins. It is important to note however, that even if 
industry Momentum subsumes individual stock Momentum in that the sample averages 
are similar and that risk-managing works equally well for industry Momentum, this 
does not necessarily mean that the stochastic processes underlying those averages share 
similar properties and as a result stem from the same origins. Pan et al. find evidence to 
support the fact that industry Momentum produces statistically significant returns only 
when own-autocorrelations are positive and statistically significant. 
 
Pan et al. (2004) have a similar time frame for their analysis as did Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz (1999), with the exception that Pan et al. use weekly data instead of monthly 
in order to increase the power of their tests resulting from larger sample size. They 
gather their data from the CRSP database using all stocks listed in NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ. As their data is from the U.S. they use SIC codes to divide companies into 
20 industries as did Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999). Portfolio returns are equally 
weighted. The biggest difference to earlier studies on industry Momentum is that Pan et 
al. utilize an alternate J/K strategy as the one most typically used doesn’t allow to 
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distinguish the impact of autocorrelations at higher orders for returns. Instead they 
follow a strategy that buys the sorted portfolios at time t where the winners and losers 
have been sorted based on t-k. This construction method allows for decomposing of kth 
order own-autocorrelations and cross-autocorrelations of industry returns. In this way, 
the authors are able to evaluate industry Momentum returns and in relation to own-
autocorrelations and cross-autocorrelations of industry portfolio returns at various lags. 
 
Pan et al. (2004) find evidence that support the notion of industry Momentum profits 
being positive and statistically significant especially at short-term horizons, namely less 
than 4 weeks. As mentioned above though, this is only the case when own-
autocorrelations are positive and significant. What Pan et al. however cannot account 
for, is the possibility that industry Momentum returns in their study are the product of 
spurious autocorrelations in industry portfolios that may be caused by some unknown 
economic factor. Additionally, the authors acknowledge the fact that transaction costs 
may once again significantly and detrimentally affect industry Momentum returns, 
especially so with weekly data as the turnovers for the portfolios increase even further 
than with monthly data. 
 
Du and Denning (2005) conducted a study which aimed to discern whether industry 
Momentum could be explained by an asset pricing model which, in addition to 
contemporaneous factors, included lagged ones as well. The original Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) study addressed this idea as well, but in their study, only a lagged market 
factor was used in a one factor model, which faired weakly. Thus, Du and Denning add 
lagged Fama-French factors into their model and conclude that such additions make for 
an asset pricing model that explains industry Momentum returns to a great extent This 
addition of lagged variables follows from the idea that Momentum returns may be 
attributed to initial underreactions by the market. As a result, they conjecture that 
industry Momentum returns can, in fact, be explained by common risk instead of 
idiosyncratic risk. These findings directly contradict those of Grinblatt and Moskowitz 
(1999), who support the idea that industry Momentum is explained by industry specific 
idiosyncratic risk, which is supported by their findings. Therefore, as with individual 
stock Momentum, the explanation for industry Momentum returns are heavily disputed 
and no definitive conclusions seemingly exist. 
 
Du and Denning (2005) do not regress Momentum profits directly on their model of 
contemporaneous and lagged variables as they claim that it may be an inappropriate 
approach because the factor loadings of Momentum portfolios change on a monthly 
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basis as they are rebalanced. So they adjust their investment period returns based on 
their delayed-reaction model. The authors use 30 industries and implement the typical 
equally-weighted and value-weighted decile ranking for their Momentum strategy 
inside a sample spanning from 1926 to 2003. Similarly, to this study, Du and Denning 
gather their data from Kenneth French’s website and utilize excess returns, instead of 
raw returns in their study. They use the J/K strategy of 6/6 and implement a skipped 
month when analyzing the value-weighted strategy and neglect the skipping when they 
analyze the equally-weighted strategy. Skipping the latest month, and/or using a value-
weighted versus equally weighted strategy makes no relevant difference. 
 
Du and Denning (2005) present interesting arguments as to why individual Momentum 
and industry Momentum are not the same. First they cite the fact that individual 
Momentum returns differ greatly when the latest month is skipped in between the 
ranking and investment periods, as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) originally displayed, 
whereas industry Momentum returns do not experience this effect. In the same vein, 
individual Momentum experiences a strong January effect and industry Momentum has 
a weak one. Prior to 1963, equally-weighted industry Momentum portfolios had a 
significant January effect, which the authors conjecture might be explained by the effect 
of small stocks that may have been pronounced as industry portfolios were rather small 
in the time period. As a result, the authors focus their analysis on value-weighted 
portfolios. These arguments for why individual Momentum and industry Momentum 
differ, offers an ever interesting build-up to the analysis of this thesis, as again, the 
argument follows that if individual stock Momentum and industry Momentum are 
different from each other, then risk-managed Momentum (Barroso & Santa Clara, 2015) 
shouldn’t work as such in the case of industry Momentum. On the other hand, if it does, 
it should serve as a counter argument in the same frame of logic to the argument that the 
two respective Momentum strategies are different from each other. Then again, even if 
risk-managing works for industry Momentum as well, this does not have to indicate 
shared similarities in the origins of individual stock Momentum and industry 
Momentum, as the potential success of risk-management for both may be occur by 
chance as well. The same is true for the opposite.  
 
The results that Du and Denning (2005) find imply that the common-factor component 
using the traditional Fama-French model is incapable of explaining industry Momentum 
returns as it is 0.01 % per month with a t-statistic of 0.27. However, when the lagged 
Fama-French factors are added into the model alongside the contemporaneous ones, the 
explanatory power of returns per month shifts up to 0.23 %, which amounts to 41 % of 
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the raw profits. When allowing for time variation in factor loadings common risk 
explains an even higher share of industry Momentum profits with the delayed-reaction 
model. These results point towards the implication that industry Momentum is not the 
result of idiosyncratic risk relating to industries, but rather more closely linked to 
common risk. 
 
The main characteristics of the studies on industry Momentum presented above are 
summarized in table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2. Profitability of Industry Momentum 
The industry Momentum strategy described above used in Grinblatt and Moskowitz 
(1999) produces average monthly returns of 0.43 %, which are very similar in 
magnitude to the returns produced by individual stock Momentum. When control 
variables for size and book-to-market are added industry Momentum produces average 
monthly abnormal returns of 0.29 % per month with the strategy discussed above. As 
was the case with returns, transaction costs are also in line with individual stock 
Momentum and Grinblatt and Moskowitz approximates annual portfolio turnover for 
the 6/6 strategy to be around 200 %, which comes down to breakeven transaction costs 
being 0.75 % per dollar of long and/or short transactions. Transaction costs due to high 
turnover affect the one-month strategy even more than the six-month strategy, even 
though the previous one has higher returns. This indicates that for industry Momentum, 
transactions costs may deter the profitable returns associated with the investment 
strategy and Grinblatt and Moskowitz propose this to be a subject for further research. 
Transaction costs will not be associated in the empirical part of this study, as the aim of 
this research is merely to see if risk-management increases the profitability of industry 
Momentum, and this doesn’t require taking transaction costs into account as such. As 
with transaction costs being a potential source of limitations for the profitability of 
industry Momentum, so are limits to arbitrage in the form of the inability to short all 
Table 5. The main characteristics of the industry Momentum papers discussed in this chapter. J in J/K refers to 
the formation period in Momentum strategies and K refers to the holding period. (Grinblatt & Moskowitz, 
1999; Nijman et al., 2004; Pan et al., 2004; Du & Denning, 2005) 
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necessary stocks. Grinblatt and Moskowitz note that not all stocks are easily borrowed 
and those that are rarely have short sale proceeds and margins that earn more than the 
market rate of return. 
 
Further on, from a profitability point of view Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) assert 
that Momentum strategies aren’t very well diversified because if industry Momentum 
does indeed explain returns to individual stock Momentum, it is evident that these 
returns stem from intra-industry returns that are more often than not highly correlated. 
However, it is important to note, that according to Grinblatt and Moskowitz, industry 
Momentum produces higher returns than individual stock Momentum. Does the higher 
correlation of the stocks that produce Momentum returns, i.e. greater risk as they aren’t 
as diversified as assumed, explain higher returns to industry Momentum as opposed to 
individual stock Momentum? In other words, does the higher correlation of firms – and 
thus greater risk because of inefficient diversification – that come from the same 
industry, that produce industry Momentum returns explain why industry Momentum 
returns are greater than individual stock Momentum returns?  
 
The Nijman et al. (2004) study suggests that industry Momentum portfolios that are 
diversified with respect to countries included in their study yield on average an excess 
monthly return of 0.55 %. The Automobiles industry yields the lowest value-weighted 
average monthly returns at 0.59 %, whereas the corresponding highest returns come 
from Software & Services at 2.55 %. As well as having the highest returns, Software & 
Services also has the highest standard deviation of 9.5 %. Conversely the lowest 
standard deviation isn’t in fact attributed to Automobiles but Utilities, for which it is 4.1 
%. By comparison, weighting these returns equally or by value doesn’t cause a 
significant change in the returns.  
 
The takeaway for profitable Momentum investing from Nijman et al. (2004) is that even 
though individual stock Momentum explains most of the returns to Momentum, 
investors would still be wise to first sort countries into past winners and losers, then 
industries and finally stocks. A potential drawback however once again results from 
transaction costs. Nijman et al. estimate that transaction costs could rise as high as 6 % 
for Momentum with a turnover of each stock twice a year. This results in approximately 
cutting the Momentum returns in half. 
 
Du and Denning (2005) find similar results for the profitability of industry Momentum 
as studies that came before theirs. Both, equally-weighted and value-weighted industry 
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Momentum strategies are profitable, and value-weighted, which was the author’s focus, 
produced 0.56 % per month on average, with a t-statistic of 3.81. The authors, however 
find that in the sub-sample period of 1926 – 1945, this strategy was not profitable.  
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6. RISK-MANAGED MOMENTUM 
Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) unveiled results that may have a lasting impact on 
Momentum and the academic literature surrounding it. Their findings on the 
manageability of the risk associated with Momentum begs questions and further 
research to establish whether their method of managing the risk of Momentum is indeed 
revolutionary and as robust as the authors claim. This chapter describes the study 
conducted by Barroso and Santa Clara and fully details it in order to preface the 
methodologies used in the empirical part of this thesis. 
 
In terms of profitability, Momentum beats other well-known anomalistic investment 
strategies in value and size, but it is occasionally plagued by crashes that threaten the 
cumulative returns of the strategy, and thus may deter away investors who fear excess 
kurtosis and negative skewness (Barroso & Santa Clara, 2015). Barroso and Santa Clara 
however find, that the risk associated with Momentum is highly predictable and thus 
manageable. Managing this risk in turn, nearly doubles the Sharpe ratio of Momentum 
and nearly completely eliminates the crashes Momentum may exhibit. 
 
To highlight the impact of Momentum crashes, it is useful to regard the effects that 
these crashes have on cumulative returns to the strategy (figure 2). Thus, the importance 
of eliminating Momentum crashes and consequently improving the profitability of 
Momentum is evident when prior historical crashes are considered (figure 3). The first 
example is associated with the Great Depression and more specifically 1932, when 
Momentum would have delivered -91.56 % returns in just two months (Barroso & Santa 
Clara, 2015). A more recent record of a Momentum crash comes in the midst of the 
Financial Crisis, when Momentum delivered a -73.42 % return in three months in 2009. 
Even though Momentum produces on average, 1.75 % monthly excess returns (Barroso 
& Santa Clara, 2015), these crashes cause significant losses that take decades to recover 
from. This highlights the imperative importance of managing the crash risk of 
Momentum and hence, increasing its profitability. 
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The method Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) use to control the risk of Momentum relies 
purely on ex ante information and is initially based on estimating the risk from daily 
variances of returns. An autoregressive model of monthly return variances manages to 
produce and out-of-sample R-square of 57.82 %, which is very high (19.01 percentage 
points higher) when it is compared to a similar model predicting the market portfolio, 
which is notoriously predictable with similar models. Next, the weight in the 
Momentum strategy is scaled according to the realized variance of returns from the past 
six months, with the aim of maintaining constant volatility. This scaling of the strategy 
improves the Sharpe ratio from 0.53 for regular Momentum, to 0.97 (table 6) for risk-
managed Momentum. This increase in the Sharpe ratio is complemented by a drop in 
kurtosis from 18.24 to 2.68 and a similar decrease in negative skewness from -2.47 to -
0.42. As a result of this decreased risk, the one-month maximum negative return 
decreases from  -78.96 % for regular Momentum to -28.40 % for risk-managed 
Momentum. Similarly, the maximum drawdown for raw Momentum returns decreases 
from -96.69 % for regular Momentum, to -45.20 % for risk-managed Momentum. 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative returns of regular Momentum and market minus the risk-free rate during periods 
exhibiting Momentum crashes. (Barroso & Santa Clara, 2015) 
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Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) also conduct robustness checks, to show that risk-
managed Momentum has very similar results internationally, as it does in the U.S. They 
further show that sub-sample time periods exhibit the same results as in the entire time 
period, demonstrating that periods with crashes or without crashes to regular 
Momentum do not alter the results. The authors also address the commonly raised issue 
of high turnover and consequently high transaction costs eating away Momentum 
profits, by declaring that as turnover for regular and risk-managed Momentum are 
similar, due to the higher profitability of risk-managed Momentum, transaction costs are 
less of an issue for the risk-managed strategy. In fact, according to the estimation of the 
Portfolio Maximum Minimum Mean Standard Kurtosis Skewness Sharpe
deviation ratio
WML 26.18 -78.96 14.46 27.53 18.24 -2.47 0.53
WML* 21.95 -28.40 16.50 16.95 2.68 -0.42 0.97
Table 6. The first row (WML) represents the economic performance of regular Momentum and the second 
row represents the economic performance of risk-managed Momentum (WML*) respectively. The time period 
extends from March 1927 to December 2011. The mean, standard deviation, and the Sharpe ratio are 
annualized. (Barroso & Santa Clara, 2015) 
Figure 3. Cumulative returns of regular Momentum and risk-managed Momentum during periods exhibiting 
Momentum crashes. (Barroso & Santa Clara, 2015) 
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authors, the turnover rate for risk-managed Momentum is only 100 basis points higher 
(75 %) per month of trading. 
 
As to why managing Momentum’s risk with realized variances works, Barroso and 
Santa Clara (2015) decompose Momentum’s volatility into market and specific strategy 
based components. This decomposition reveals that the market component risk only 
accounts for 23 % of the average total risk, thus meaning that the specific component is 
much larger. As it turns out, this specific component of risk is more persistent and 
predictable with an out-of-sample R-square of 47.06 % as opposed to an R-square of 
20.87 % for the market component. The persistence of realized variances for 
Momentum is also higher, which is evident from the AR(1) autoregressive model used 
by Barroso and Santa Clara. The coefficient for Momentum from the AR(1) model is 
0.77, which is 0.19 higher than for the market. 
 
In closing, it is important to note that Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) put forth that 
more than half of Momentum’s risk is predictable. No other risk factor in financial 
academia has a higher predictable portion of risk (Barroso & Santa Clara, 2015). In fact, 
it is evident from the data that Barroso and Santa Clara use, that the relation between 
risk and return for Momentum is negative. As before, risk-managed Momentum relies 
purely on ex-ante information, which digresses from many potentially profitable trading 
strategies in that it can actually be utilized in real-time. Additionally, Barroso and Santa 
Clara find no credence in that statement that Momentum has died down in roughly the 
last 10 years. Instead they conjecture that the period may have withheld a number of 
high risk episodes that may have affected the performance of Momentum. The work of 
Barroso and Santa Clara may prove to be the most profitable Momentum strategy 
applicable to real-life markets. Thus it warrants more research on the topic to assess the 
validity of its potential. 
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7. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
7.1. Data Collection and Description 
The data for this thesis comes from Kenneth French’s website. The website has 
readymade monthly and daily return data sets for industry portfolios in the U.S., out of 
which the set for 30 industry portfolios is used here. The time period for the data set is 
from July 1926 to December 2015, which means 89 years and 5 months’ worth of data. 
The stocks in the data set come from NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ where each stock is 
assigned to an industry based on their four-digit SIC code. This assignment to specific 
industries is done at the end of June of year t. The SIC codes originally come from 
Compustat and for year t, t-1 SIC codes are used. Whenever the Compustat SIC codes 
are unavailable CRSP SIC codes are used. Returns are then computed from July of year 
t, to June of t+1. (French, 2016) The monthly returns are used to calculate monthly 
returns for the industry Momentum portfolios and the daily returns are used to calculate 
daily industry Momentum returns which are then utilized to calculate the realized 
variances for the risk-managed industry Momentum strategy. These realized variances 
are utilized in calculating the time-varying weights for the risk-managed industry 
Momentum strategy. 
 
The Fama-French Three Factor Model values are from Kenneth French’s website as 
well. They too, are monthly observations and span from July 1926 to December 2015. 
The factors themselves are formed by value-weighting 6 portfolios on size and book-to-
market. SMB is formed by subtracting the average returns of three big portfolios from 
the average returns of three small portfolios. HML is calculated by subtracting the 
average returns of two growth portfolios from the average returns of two value 
portfolios. The Rm-Rf factor is formed by all CRSP stocks incorporated in the U.S. and 
listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The returns are value-weighted and each stock 
has to have a CRSP share code of 10 or 11 at the beginning of month t, good price and 
share data at the beginning of month t, and good data on returns for t minus the one-
month Treasury bill. The Treasury bill rate originally comes from Ibbotson Associates. 
(French, 2016) 
 
The data for the utilization of the Fama-French Five Factor model are downloaded from 
Kenneth French’s website similarly to the previous data. The composition of the factors 
differs slightly from the FF3 even for the identically named factors. The time period for 
the FF5 factors differs as well, which results in unavoidably differing time periods for 
the actual regressions later on. The FF5 factors account for the years from July 1963 to 
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December 2015. The SMB factor in the FF5 is computed by subtracting the average 
return of nine big stock portfolios from the average return to nine small stock portfolios. 
The HML factor is formed identically to that of the FF3. RMW or Robust Minus Weak 
is calculated by subtracting the average returns to two weak operating profitability 
portfolios from the average returns to two robust operating profitability portfolios. 
CMA or Conservative Minus Aggressive is the difference between the average returns 
of two conservative investment portfolios and two aggressive investment portfolios. 
The Rm-Rf factor is formed in similar fashion as in the FF3. (French, 2016) 
 
The data for the three and five factor models is adequate in its downloaded form as it is 
serving as the independent variables for the study and thus need no further refinement. 
The return data however is further manipulated to form Momentum portfolios. The 
manipulation begins with computing rolling past six-month returns for all of the 
industry portfolios for the duration of the time periods utilized. This reflects the ranking 
window of six months or J = 6 in our J/K strategy of 6/1. Next, the top decile of 
industries is assigned to a winner portfolio each month – as the strategy rebalances 
monthly – and the bottom decile of industries are assigned to a loser portfolio 
respectively. This is repeated every month without skipping the most recent formation 
month, as Du and Denning (2005) point out that skipping the latest formation month 
doesn’t affect returns either statistically or in magnitude. Deciles are used here instead 
of e.g. top and bottom 30 % as in Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) because a prevailing 
theme in this thesis is indeed profitability. As such, a finer ranking procedure should 
produce higher profitability in the subsequent Momentum strategy. This formulation is 
used to calculate returns for the winner portfolio and loser portfolios separately. Equal 
weighted portfolios are used here, not because there’s specific motivation to do so, but 
simply because Nijman et al. (2004) conclude that value weighting or equal weighting 
industry Momentum portfolios makes no difference in terms of the magnitude or 
significance of returns. Finally, the returns to the loser portfolio are simply subtracted 
from the returns to the winner portfolio and thus we end up with returns to the industry 
Momentum portfolio for June 1927 to December 2015.   
 
After the time-series of returns for industry Momentum have been calculated, the 
process of risk-managing the returns is the next step. We apply the methodology of 
Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) directly, which require utilizing daily returns of the 
industry Momentum strategy to form time-varying weights for participation in the 
strategy itself. This is done with the following formula: 
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(6.)     𝜎𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡
2 = 21 ∑ 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑑𝑡−1−𝑗
2  /126125𝑗=0  
 
Where rWML,t represents the monthly returns to Momentum, rWML,d the daily returns to 
Momentum, and dt the dates of the last trading sessions each month for the time series. 
 
To be more specific, the formula entails first calculating the sum of past six-month daily 
trading day returns at the beginning of each month. These are then multiplied by 21 and 
divided by 126. This gives us the variance forecast which is needed in the next formula. 
 
The forecasted variances are used to calculate the weights, relating the estimates to the 
constant amount of risk that is targeted with the following formula: 
 
(7.)     𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿∗,𝑡 =  
𝜎𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝜎𝑡
𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡  
 
Where rWML,t is the unscaled plain Momentum, rWML*,t is risk-managed Momentum, and 
the numerator represents the targeted level of volatility. Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) 
choose a target of annualized volatility equal to 12 %. What this then means is that the 
square root of the variance forecasts is taken and divided by the monthly target 
volatility derived from the 12 % annualized volatility, which is 3.46 %. The target of 
3.46 % is divided by the volatility estimates to end up with weights that determine how 
vested the position in industry Momentum should be for each month. This process is 
repeated at each turn of the month for the whole time period. 
 
Finally, to arrive at the actual return series, the monthly returns to industry Momentum 
are simply multiplied with the corresponding monthly weights. This scales the 
participation of the strategy. Throughout the time period utilized in the sample, the 
weights for risk-managed industry Momentum vary between 0.26 and 4.18, whereas the 
original paper by Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) report weights varying between 0.13 
and 2.00. Conjecture for the difference in weight ranges between risk-managed industry 
and individual Momentum is presented later in this thesis. 
7.2. Methodology 
The methodology used to test the two hypothesis presented in the beginning of this 
thesis are reliant on multivariate regressions, where the FF3 and FF5 factors act as 
independent variables. In order to conclusively reject the null hypotheses both factor 
models should be unable to explain the Momentum returns. Conflicting findings would 
result in a need for further research on the topic. The regression to test the first 
 58 
hypothesis has industry Momentum returns as the dependent variable and the FF3 
factors as the independent variables. This same regression is also run with the FF5 
factors as the independent variables. The latter of these is presented below as it holds 
the first one within it as well. 
  
(8.)     𝑅𝐼𝑀 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓) +  𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐵) +  𝛽3(𝐻𝑀𝐿) + 𝛽4(𝑅𝑀𝑊) +
 𝛽5(𝐶𝑀𝐴) +  𝜀 
 
RIM represents the returns for industry Momentum, Rm – Rf stands for risk-adjusted 
market returns, SMB is returns to small firms minus returns to large ones, HML means 
returns to value minus returns to growth, RMW stands for robust profitability returns 
minus weak profitability returns and finally CMW stands for the difference between 
portfolios constructed on conservative and aggressive firm returns. (Fama & French, 
2015) 
 
The same type of regression is also used to test whether risk-managed industry 
Momentum produces significant abnormal returns. The only difference being the 
dependent variable, which in the case of testing the second hypothesis is the monthly 
returns from risk-managed industry Momentum. In the same vein, these returns are 
regressed on the FF3 factors and subsequently on the FF5 factors. The second of these 
regressions is once again presented below and the first one is not, as it is inherent in the 
latter one as well, simply excluding the last two factors. 
 
(9.) 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑀 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 −  𝑅𝑓) +  𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐵) +  𝛽3(𝐻𝑀𝐿) +  𝛽4(𝑅𝑀𝑊) +
 𝛽5(𝐶𝑀𝐴) +  𝜀 
 
RRMIM represents the risk-managed industry Momentum returns. All of the independent 
variables are identical to those already explained above. 
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8. RESULTS 
The focus of this chapter is in describing the results from the empirical models that were 
presented previously. First, graphs depicting the cumulative returns for the market 
(MKT-RF), industry Momentum (WML), and risk-managed industry Momentum 
(WML*) will be presented and discussed, then descriptive statistics will be presented 
pertaining to the original hypotheses. This is followed by the actual regression results 
and finally evidence from robustness tests are displayed and discussed. 
 
Figure 4 graphs the cumulative returns of industry Momentum and the market during 
crash periods. The graphs span from January 1930 to December 1939 and January 2000 
to December 2009, thus withholding the Momentum crash of 1932 and likewise the 
Momentum crash that occurred during the global financial crisis in 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Panel A depicts the cumulative returns of the market minus risk-free 
rate (MKT-RF) and industry Momentum (WML) during the period January 1930 – 
December 1939. Panel B depicts the same in the period January 2000 – December 
2009. 
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Panel A in figure 4 plots the cumulative returns to industry Momentum and the market 
from January 1930 to December 1939. This graph is essentially a duplicate of the 
Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) graph that plots cumulative returns to Momentum and 
the market and is thus, meant to be compared to it as well. The Momentum crash of 
1932 is clearly exhibited in industry Momentum in the graph and it is highly similar to 
the crash to individual stock Momentum. As with individual stock Momentum, industry 
Momentum crashes in 1932, subsequently experiencing a small rebound before it 
continues a steady downward drift in the post-crash years, which ends in a slight dip at 
the eve of World War II. The overall cumulative return pattern between individual stock 
Momentum and industry Momentum is thus roughly the same, with the exception of 
individual stock Momentum crashing to a near zero level, whereas industry Momentum 
briefly recovers after the 1932 crash, only to drift down to a level of 0.24. Panel A also 
indicates what is known from Barroso and Santa Clara (2015), in that the market 
recovers from the 1932 crash at a faster rate than Momentum, whether it be individual 
stock or industry Momentum. The magnitude of the 1932 crash for industry Momentum 
witnesses a drop of -59.85 % from 0.99 to 0.40 through June 1932 to May 1933. Even 
though the magnitude of the crash is large for industry Momentum, it compares 
favorably with the -91.59 % returns that individual stock Momentum experiences in just 
two months in 1932 (Barroso and Santa Clara, 2015).  
 
Panel B in figure 4 graphs the same cumulative returns as above with the exception, that 
the time period now spans from January 2000 to December 2009. This is again, an 
almost exact duplicate from Barroso and Santa Clara (2015), where they illustrate the 
Momentum crash of 2009 and its effects on cumulative returns to Momentum. As with 
individual stock Momentum, industry Momentum suffers the same crash in 2009. From 
its peak of 5.24 in February 2009 industry Momentum suffers a drop to a trough of 3.08 
which equals a -41.24 % drop in cumulative returns, producing a less severe drawdown 
on Momentum returns compared to the 1932 crash. Overall the return pattern in the 
graph for industry Momentum is similar to that of individual stock Momentum as 
presented by Barroso and Santa Clara. Of notice however, is the fact that cumulative 
returns on individual stock Momentum drop by -73.42 % in three months, which is a 
much higher drop than what industry Momentum experiences. Industry Momentum also 
begins its recovery much faster in the post-crash period, which is also evident from 
panel B. 
 
Figure 5 graphs the cumulative returns to industry Momentum and risk-managed 
industry Momentum for the same years, as the figure before it. This is essentially the 
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same comparison Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) made between Momentum and risk-
managed Momentum. The aim here is to graphically illustrate the ability of risk-
managing industry Momentum to decrease the downside risk of the strategy, and more 
specifically to decrease the downside of crash risk. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A in figure 5 plots the cumulative returns of industry Momentum and risk-
managed industry Momentum from January 1930 to December 1939. The pattern of the 
two lines in the graph are noticeably similar almost throughout the figure with a few 
exceptions. WML* produces higher returns up until the crash of 1932, whereupon both 
strategies suffer drops in cumulative returns. However, whereas WML dropped 59.85 % 
Figure 5. Panel A depicts the cumulative returns of industry Momentum (WML) 
and risk-managed industry Momentum (WML*) in the period January 1930 – 
December 1993. Panel B depicts the same in the period January 2000 – 
December 2009. 
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WML*’s drop is contained to a severely smaller loss, the cumulative returns only 
dropping by -21.59 %. The drop WML* suffers is 61.74 % smaller than the drop WML 
undergoes. Risk-management hence brings about a large reduction in the downside of 
the 1932 Momentum crash. After the crash, both WML and WML* cumulative returns 
tread downwards at similar rates, the difference however being, that WML*’s 
cumulative return line slides at a much higher level than the returns to WML. 
 
Panel B presents the final graph, which plots industry Momentum and risk-managed 
industry Momentum cumulative returns from January 2000 to December 2009. As 
before, the meaningful course of action is to view how much downside risk-
management in Momentum brings when compared in cumulative returns. For the first 
half of the graph both WML and WML* returns develop at similar rate. Halfway 
through however, WML cumulative returns rise higher than WML* returns and before 
the crash they are indeed almost 52 % higher. Then the Momentum crash of 2009 
ensues and WML suffers a -41.24 % drop, while WML* suffers only a dramatically 
reduced -7.72 % decline. The returns to WML* suffer a decline that is 81.28 % smaller 
than the decline that WML suffers in 2009. This is a second demonstration of the ability 
of risk-managed industry Momentum to greatly limit the downside on industry 
Momentum. Even though the time period in panel B ends with WML producing higher 
cumulative returns than WML*, it does so with the cost of inherently evident crash risk, 
which is clearly exhibited in the 2009 crash. Thanks to the evidence in figure 4 and 5, a 
strong case can be made for the reduction of crash risk when risk-managing industry 
Momentum. 
 
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for the whole sample time periods for both, the 
time period involved in the FF3 regressions and the time periods involved in the FF5 
regressions. As was already mentioned before, these time periods differ as the original 
data from Kenneth French’s website is different for the FF3 and FF5 data sets. For the 
time period involving the FF3 model (January 1928 to December 2015) the annualized 
mean return for industry Momentum is 15.49 % whereas the annualized mean return for 
risk-managed industry Momentum is 17.74 %. Thus, the annual mean return for the 
risk-managed counterpart of industry Momentum is roughly 200 basis points higher, 
which is a clear indication that risk-managed industry Momentum is definitely more 
profitable in terms of mean returns than regular industry Momentum. However, the time 
period involving the FF5 model (July 1963 to December 2015) produces very similar 
annualized mean returns for both, industry Momentum and risk-managed industry 
Momentum, as the annualized mean return for industry Momentum is 23.29 % and the 
 63 
equivalent annualized mean returns for risk-managed industry Momentum is 23.14 %. 
Now only a 15 basis point difference is evident in the returns between the two 
strategies. The returns for the FF5 model time period may be higher than for the FF3 
model time period because of the fact that the previous period only exhibits one 
Momentum crash as the latter exhibits two, both in 1932 and 2009. As a result, WML 
returns in the FF5 time period may appear more favorable in terms of annualized mean 
returns compared to the FF3 time period, as there is essentially only one crash to risk-
manage in the time period. Regardless of the higher returns for the FF5 model time 
period, 1 dollar invested with the annualized mean return of 17.74 % for risk-managed 
industry Momentum from the FF3 model time period would have compounded into 
1 480 440 dollars over the 87 years that the data spans. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk-managing industry Momentum has a clear effect of minimizing the downside of 
negative returns for the regular industry Momentum strategy. The minimum monthly 
return for industry Momentum in the larger time period is -47.06 % while it is only -
18.32 % for risk-managed industry Momentum in the same time period. This is almost 
3000 basis points smaller, which is a very noticeable difference. Interestingly the -47.06 
% drop for industry Momentum comes in January of 2001, which is eight years 
removed from 2009, the year of the second infamous, less dramatic Momentum crash. 
Coincidentally, the largest monthly minimum returns for WML* occur during the same 
month in the same year. As the largest negative monthly return for risk-managed 
industry Momentum and its non-managed counterpart comes in January 2001, it may be 
reasonable to conjecture that the bursting of the tech bubble contributed massively to 
this downturn. The drop of January 2001 for industry Momentum however is at odds 
Table 7. The table presents the descriptive statistics for industry Momentum (WML) and risk-managed 
industry Momentum (WML*) in two different time periods. The first time period (FF3) spans January 1928 – 
December 2015. The second time period spans July 1963 – December 2015. Reported figures are monthly 
except for the mean, standard deviation and Sharpe ratio, which are annualized. 
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with the traditional view that the market crash of 1932 exhibits the worst month for 
Momentum. Regardless of the traditional view however, the January 2001 drop for 
industry Momentum is highly likely linked to the bursting of the tech bubble as its 
effects were felt at the time and this may be magnified by incorporating the whole 
industry as a portfolio in the strategy. Interesting to note however, is the fact that while 
industry Momentum suffered a -47.06 % and risk-managed industry Momentum a -
18.32 % drop, the returns for the whole market went up by 3.67 % during the same 
month. 
 
While the downside of industry Momentum can be seemingly effectively controlled by 
risk-management, the upside of the strategy appears to be beneficially affected as well. 
This is alluded to by the maximum returns for both time periods. In the FF3 (FF5) time 
period, industry Momentum has maximum monthly returns of 26.13 % (26.13%) and 
risk-managed industry Momentum has maximum monthly returns of 25.56 % (26.56 
%). A widely known fact in finance is that the largest gains in the stock market often 
directly follow large drops. As risk-managed Momentum is scaled by realized 
variances, there may be a lag effect that decreases participation in the strategy during 
those high gain days on account of high realized variances in recent market drops. 
However, this potential lag effect works both ways, as the realized variances may 
increase participation during rises in mid-bull markets, leading to higher maximum 
monthly returns despite smaller participation in the immediate bull days following 
market troughs. This may be able to explain why maximum returns to WML* 
outperform maximum returns to WML, as was the case with minimum returns 
 
The annualized standard deviations of industry Momentum compared to risk-managed 
industry Momentum in both time periods are noticeably higher. The annualized 
standard deviations for the FF3 (FF5) model time period are 20.83 (22.34) for industry 
Momentum and 16.19 (17.75) for risk-managed industry Momentum. This finding 
differs somewhat from the original findings for individual stock Momentum by Barroso 
and Santa Clara (2015). In their paper, they report an annualized standard deviation of 
27.53 for Momentum and 16.95 for risk-managed Momentum, meaning that the relative 
decrease in standard deviation is larger in risk-managed individual stock Momentum. It 
then follows that in Barroso and Santa Clara’s findings the Sharpe ratio of risk-managed 
Momentum increases both because of an increase in mean returns and a decrease in 
standard deviation. This much is true for industry Momentum and risk-managed 
industry Momentum as well, however, risk-managed industry Momentum’s Sharpe 
ratio increases comparatively more from an increase in mean returns and less so due to a 
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decrease in standard deviation.  The standard deviation for industry Momentum – 
whether it be regular or risk-managed – is closer to the standard deviation of risk-
managed individual stock Momentum than individual stock Momentum. This might be 
an implication of using portfolios – in this case industries – for the Momentum strategy 
instead of individual stocks. Portfolios tend to inherently have a greater amount of 
stocks within them already and thus the standard deviation of returns is smaller. As risk-
managing industry Momentum still deals with portfolios, the reason for a relatively 
smaller change in standard deviation – compared to what Barroso and Santa Clara 
(2015) report – may lie within the same logic. Therefore, risk-managing Momentum in 
industries doesn’t increase profitability as measured by the Sharpe ratio, as much in the 
case of industries as it does in individual stocks. 
 
This leads us on to perhaps the most interesting finding within the descriptive statistics 
– and arguably the most interesting finding in this thesis – which is concerned with 
skewness. The negative skewness of Momentum is perhaps the most widely cited 
downside to the strategy as a whole. The crashes inherent to Momentum may erase 
away massive amounts of cumulative returns which take decades to recover from 
(Barroso & Santa Clara, 2015). This is exactly the reason why Barroso and Santa 
Clara’s finding of Momentum risk-management is so exciting. However, Barroso and 
Santa Clara aren’t arguably able to rid Momentum from its crash risk entirely. This 
argument is buffed by the fact that risk-managed individual stock Momentum still 
retains its negative skewness even though it decreases from -2.47 to -0.42. Risk-
managing industry Momentum however dissipates the negative skewness of the return 
distribution entirely. This leads the foray in arguing that risk-managing industry 
Momentum indeed entirely rids its respective Momentum from crash risk. In the FF3 
(FF5) model time period skewness is -0.60 (-0.57) for industry Momentum and for risk-
managed industry Momentum the skewness is surprisingly positive at 0.45 (0.39). It is 
obvious that this whole argument relies on the semantics of defining what truly 
constitutes a Momentum crash, but constraining the largest negative monthly returns to 
-18.32 % and completely eliminating negative skewness acts as a strong argument in 
favor of this statement. Indeed, the largest negative monthly returns for MKT-RF in the 
FF3 time period are more negative (-29.13 %) than for the worst month for risk-
managed industry Momentum. I thus conjecture, that this is evidence for the first 
Momentum strategy which completely eliminates crash risk. 
 
As with risk-managed individual stock Momentum, risk-managed industry Momentum 
decreases the kurtosis of the returns distribution to near normal levels. Kurtosis for 
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industry Momentum is 10.80 in the FF3 time period and 10.51 in the FF5 period. 
However, for risk-managed industry Momentum kurtosis is only 5.24 for the FF3 time 
period and 5.11 for the FF5 period. This reduced kurtosis and near zero skewness 
indicates that the returns to risk-managed industry Momentum present an investment 
strategy that produces mean monthly returns of 1.37 % with a near-normal distribution.  
 
Finally, the descriptive statistics display the Sharpe ratios for both time periods for both 
Momentum strategies. First, it is clear that risk-managed industry Momentum is more 
profitable with a Sharpe ratio of 0.89 (1.03) compared to a Sharpe ratio of 0.60 (0.82) 
for regular industry Momentum in the FF3 (FF5) time period. The Sharpe ratio for risk-
managed industry Momentum – and for industry Momentum for that matter – in the 
FF3 time period is greater than the Sharpe ratio for individual stock Momentum, which 
is 0.53 in the Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) study. However, the Sharpe ratio of risk-
managed individual stock Momentum is higher (0.97) than the Sharpe ratio for risk-
managed industry Momentum. It should be noted however, that Barroso and Santa 
Clara (2015) do not subtract the risk-free rate from mean returns in their Sharpe ratio 
calculations, whereas this is done in the Sharpe ratio calculations presented here. 
Overall, the increase in the Sharpe ratio for industry Momentum and risk-managed 
industry Momentum is 48.33 % (25.61 %) higher in the FF3 (FF5) time period, which 
makes for a substantive increase. The increase is smaller however compared to the one 
that Barroso and Santa Clara report for risk-managed individual stock Momentum and 
its unmanaged counterpart (83.02 %). 
 
The regression results that answer the hypotheses of this thesis are presented next. They 
are found in table 8 and consist of the FF3 and FF5 regressions with alternating 
dependent variables of industry Momentum and risk-managed industry Momentum 
returns. All of the regressions run in this thesis are Newey-West corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
  
It is clear outright from table 8 that the null of the first hypothesis presented at the very 
beginning of this thesis is rejected at a 5 % significance level and even at a 1 % level. 
The alpha intercepts for both the FF3 and FF5 regressions where WML is the dependent 
variable are positive and statistically significant with p-values < 0.00. The alpha 
intercepts of both regressions communicate that WML has on average 1.39 % abnormal 
monthly returns in the FF3 time period and 1.61 % abnormal monthly returns in the FF5 
time period. As for the second hypothesis, an almost identical conclusion is reached: the 
null of the second hypothesis is rejected at both 5 % and 1 % significance levels. 
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WML* produces on average 1.43 % abnormal returns on a monthly basis when 
regressed on the FF3 factors and 1.73 % abnormal returns when regressed on the FF5 
factors. Both alpha intercepts have p-values < 0.00. These null rejections mean that in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
both time periods industry Momentum and risk-managed industry Momentum service 
as profitable investment strategies capable of providing abnormal returns. For industry 
Momentum, this serves as yet another out-of-sample test, but for risk-managed industry 
Momentum this provides first ever results of its anomalous performance in producing 
returns. Further, the abnormal returns WML* provides are higher than those that WML 
provides, which is consistent with the Sharpe ratio being higher for WML*. WML* is a 
more profitable investment strategy than WML both in terms of abnormal returns and 
Table 8. The table reports the results of the Fama-French three 
factor model regressions and the Fama-French five factor model 
regressions for their respective time-periods (1928-2015 & 1963-
2015). Alpha is the intercept of the regression, MKT-RF is the 
market return minus the risk-free rate, SMB is the returns to Small 
minus Big stocks, HML is the return to High book-to-market minus 
returns to Low book-to-market, RMW is the returns of Robust 
minus Weak operating profitability portfolios, and CMA is the 
returns to Conservative minus Aggressive investment portfolios. 
WML is the return to industry Momentum and WML* is the return 
to risk-managed industry Momentum. All regressions are Newey-
West (1987) corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Sharpe ratios. With these results it is safe to say that the research question of this thesis 
is now answered. However, further investigation and robustness tests will follow, to 
further test the evidence that has been presented thus far. 
 
To divulge rest of the information from table 8, it is obviously of interest to look at the 
factor loadings, whether they are significant, and what is the explanatory power of the 
models themselves. First and foremost, all of the coefficients of all of the independent 
variables in the models associated with WML* are not significant. Thus, the FF3 and 
FF5 models do a poor job at explaining the returns to WML*. The closest any 
independent variables’ coefficient comes to being able to explain returns, is in the FF5 
model for WML* returns. In this model CMA has a loading of 0.44 and a p-value of 
0.10, which is beyond the scope of 5 % significance and additionally its loading in 
relation to the alpha intercept is not economically high. This is to say that companies 
with conservative investments do not reliably explain returns to risk-managed 
Momentum at an industry level. The FF3 and FF5 do a better job in terms of explaining 
returns to WML. In the FF3 model, a single coefficient of an independent variable is 
significant and this is the MKT-RF variable. It has a loading of -0.13 with a p-value of 
0.04. This indicates that WML returns slightly negatively co-move with the market and 
as such the model provides limited insight into what makes up WML returns. The 
significance of MKT-RF may simply stem from the fact that wide portfolios of 
industries are held, which accounts for relatively large parts of the market. As a whole 
however, the explanatory power of the model is low, as the adjusted R-squared is only 
0.03, meaning that the model only explains 3 % of the returns to WML. The FF5 model 
explaining WML returns does an incrementally better job than the FF3 model in 
explaining WML returns. This model has statistically significant coefficients for HML 
and CMA. Both coefficients have relatively high loadings when compared to the Alpha 
intercept, with HML being -0.54 and CMA 1.00 respectively. HMLs p-value is 0.03 and 
CMAs 0.02 indicating that both are statistically significant at the 5 % level. The 
indication in these results is that WML returns are to a certain extent explained by 
growth firms – as a result of the negative loading – and firms that make conservative 
investments. The models explanatory power in terms of adjusted R-squared is higher at 
5 % compared to the FF3 model which managed to explain 3 % of the WML returns. 
However, this magnitude of explanatory power is low for a factor model, if it is to be 
taken seriously, but this should not come as a surprise considering the overall weak 
statistical significance of the coefficients of the independent variables. In general, 
however, both the FF3 and FF5 models did a better job at explaining returns to WML, 
than WML*.  
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As the main research questions and hypotheses of this thesis have been now answered, 
room is left for conducting robustness tests to provide further evidence in support of the 
findings presented previously. These robustness tests rather closely follow those that 
Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) put forth in their study of risk-managed Momentum. 
This is intended so that comparison of robustness between risk-managed Momentum 
and risk-managed industry Momentum is more clear and concise. 
 
Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) test risk-managed Momentum in different time periods 
or subsamples in order to see to what extent the two Momentum crashes of both 1932 
and 2009 drive their results. First, they divide the time period into two halves as a 
simple robustness test. As each half however contains a crash, they also conduct the 
same tests on a full time period without the crash years of 1932 and 2009. Finally, they 
investigate the time period of January 1945 to December 2005, which is often referred 
to as the post-war years, which were rather benign in economic nature, but where 
traditional Momentum faired rather well. This exact same logic is followed here. The 
two main differences stem from the overall slightly differing time period for the FF3 
model and the differing time period associated with the FF5 model. Regardless, all of 
the robustness checks described above are conducted on both the FF3 model time period 
and the FF5 model time period. Panel A in table 9 presents the descriptive statistics for 
the FF3 model subsample time periods and panel B presents the same information for 
the FF5 model subsample time period. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 9. Panel A displays the descriptive statistics for the FF3 time-period (1928-2015) subsamples. First half 
covers 1928-1971, second half covers 1971-2015, no-crash is the period 1928-2015 without the crash years 
1932 and 2009, and post-war covers 1945-2005. Panel B displays the descriptive statistics for the FF5 time-
period subsamples. First half covers 1963-1989, second half covers 1989-2015, no-crash is the period 1963-
2015 without the crash year of 2009, and post-war covers 1963-2005. All statistics are monthly except mean, 
standard deviation, and Sharpe ratio which are annualized. 
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The results in table 9 mostly tell the same story as the table with the descriptive 
statistics for the whole sample periods. In panel A the maximum return is mostly in 
favor of risk-managed industry Momentum with the exception of the first half, which 
spans from January 1928 to December 1971, having a higher maximum return for 
WML. In the same time period the annualized mean returns for WML are also 
noticeably lower than in the rest of the time periods. In fact, in the first half MKT-RF 
had annualized mean returns of 9.12 %, making it at face value an equally profitable 
investment with WML. In the second half however, WML makes up for its prior weak 
returns by encompassing WML* with mean returns of 23.14 %, which slightly eclipse 
the 21.27 % mean returns of WML*. If the post-war years were profitable for individual 
stock Momentum (Barroso & Santa Clara, 2015), then the same argument can be made 
for industry Momentum, but even more so for risk-managed industry Momentum. 
WML* has annualized mean returns of 23.44 % in the post-war era, which are the 
highest mean returns of all the subsamples. 
 
Skewness in panel A for WML in each period is negative and conversely for WML* it 
is positive in each period. This robustness of positive skewness in WML* returns is 
important in adding further evidence to the fact that risk-managed industry Momentum 
truly eliminates the crash risk associated with Momentum. Much the same can be said 
for kurtosis, in that in each period the statistic is dramatically lower for WML* than for 
WML. Finally, the Sharpe ratio for WML* is higher in each period than for WML, 
which adds robustness to the superior profitability of WML* as an investments strategy. 
 
Panel B displays descriptive statistics for four additional time periods which are 
identical to those used in conjunction with the FF5 model. Noteworthy in panel B is the 
fact that the first half exhibits minimum returns that are almost identical for WML and 
WML*. This indicates that out of all the time periods analyzed in this thesis, from July 
1963 to September 1989 the largest single negative return month is almost unaffected 
by risk-managing the maximum drawdowns of Momentum. Mean returns are split in 
favor of both Momentum strategies. The annualized mean returns for the first half and 
the post-war period are higher for WML* and conversely the annualized mean returns 
for the second half and the no-crash period are higher for WML. The annualized mean 
returns for the first half in particular are very high for WML* (WML) reaching 32.92 % 
(25.05 %) returns.  
 
Skewness again presents some interesting results at first glance. For the first half WML 
exhibits positive skewness for the first time in any time period utilized. Careful 
 71 
consideration however, would point to the fact that the first half contains no instances of 
Momentum crashes, which would be liable to explain this finding. Equally interesting is 
the notion that skewness for WML* is negative – the only instance of negative 
skewness for WML* in any of the time periods utilized – in the second half. However, 
juxtaposed to the first half, the second half contains the crash of 2009. In addition, the 
halves are rather much shorter due to the constrained full sample time period derived 
from the FF5 model time period. This means that the crash of 2009 has a higher impact 
on the return distribution of the data and thus will exhibit negative skewness in the 
returns. As this time period is indeed the only one with negative skewness in WML* 
returns, I am quick to dismiss it due to the magnified effect of the 2009 crash in the 
data. The Sharpe ratio again is unequivocally in favor of WML* over WML, again 
adding to the evidence suggesting that WML* is indeed more profitable than WML.  
 
In summary of all the descriptive statistics investigated in all of the time periods 
utilized, it can be argued that the findings in the original descriptive statistics are quite 
robust. Out of 10 time periods, WML* reduced minimum negative returns in each of 
them, in all 10 cases WML* reduced kurtosis, in nine out of 10 cases skewness was 
positive for WML* and in all 10 cases the Sharpe ratio was higher for WML*. In light 
of these descriptive statistics, it is fair to conjecture that these findings are robust across 
time periods. 
 
As for the descriptive statistics, robustness tests are performed similarly for the 
regressions that were run with the initial time periods. Here, the only difference to the 
regressions run earlier, are the time periods. The time periods identically match those 
that were utilized in the descriptive statistics and therefore no further added 
commentary on the nature of the following out-of-sample tests is needed. Table 10 
entails FF3 regressions run on WML and WML* in all the alternate time periods and 
table 11 entails FF5 regressions run on WML and WML* in their respective alternate 
time periods. 
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Table 10. The table reports the results of the Fama-French three factor model regressions for its sub-sample 
time-periods. First half covers 1928-1971, second half covers 1971-2015, no-crash is the period 1928-2015 
without the crash years 1932 and 2009, and post-war covers 1945-2005. Alpha is the intercept of the 
regression, MKT-RF is the market return minus the risk-free rate, SMB is the returns to Small minus Big stocks, 
and HML is the return to High book-to-market minus returns to Low book-to-market. WML is the return to 
industry Momentum and WML* is the return to risk-managed industry Momentum. All regressions are Newey-
West (1987) corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  
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The first result that should be noted in table 10 is that the alpha intercepts in all the 
regressions, both for WML and WML*, are significant at the 5 % and 1 % levels as all 
p-values < 0.00. Thus, all abnormal returns are significant and range between 1.44 % to 
1.90 % for WML and 1.18 % to 1.77 % for WML* at monthly levels. The abnormal 
returns are higher for WML* in each subsample time period excluding the second half, 
where WML abnormal returns are 1.90 % and WML* abnormal returns are 1.70 %. 
This is mostly consistent – excluding the second half, where the WML alpha was higher 
than that of WML* – with the findings in the whole sample time periods in that both 
industry Momentum and risk-managed industry Momentum produce significant 
abnormal returns and that risk-managed industry Momentum produces higher abnormal 
returns than its unmanaged counterpart. 
 
In these shorter subsample time periods, the FF3 model prevails with equally 
questionable success at explaining the returns to WML and WML*. For the FF3 models 
explaining returns to WML, only one coefficient is statistically significant for any of the 
independent variables. MKT-RF has a loading of -0.20 with a p-value of 0.03 in the 
second half time period. The loading is small in relation to the Alpha intercept of 1.90, 
but none-the-less this suggests that returns to WML somewhat negatively co-moved 
with the market during 1971 – 2015. The MKT-RF coefficient was statistically 
significant for the FF3 model in the whole sample time period, but it seems that as the 
first half time period exhibits non-significance for MKT-RF, the negative co-movement 
of WML with MKT-RF is mostly evident during 1971 – 2015. In other words, in times 
of market upsurges the winner portfolio decreased and the loser portfolio increased and 
vice versa for market downturns. This would suggest that in the time period examined, 
loser stocks are those with positive market Beta’s and winners are those with negative 
market Beta’s. As before though, the second half time period is the only subsample 
where market returns are significant as an explanatory variable. For WML* returns, the 
FF3 model yet again fails to provide any statistically significant coefficients for any 
explanatory variables. With unilaterally near-zero adjusted R-squared statistics as well, 
it is safe to say that the FF3 model does a poor job as an asset pricing model in 
explaining WML* returns.    
 
For the robustness tests concerning the FF5 model (table 11) the first finding to note – 
just as it was with the FF3 model robustness tests – is the fact that all alpha coefficients 
in all regressions are significant at the 1 % level, with p-values < 0.00. All abnormal 
returns are thus significant and range between 1.47 to 2.00 for WML and 1.11 and 2.57 
for WML* respectively. Abnormal returns are again larger in every subsample time 
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period for WML* than for WML, with the exception of the second half time period, 
which is also found in the FF3 model subsample time periods. These findings hence 
corroborate those found in the whole sample time period in that WML and WML* 
abnormal returns are positive and statistically significant and that WML* abnormal 
returns are indeed higher than similar returns to WML in the majority of cases. 
 
In the discussion above concerning the FF5 model regressions on the whole sample 
time period, it was indicated that the FF5 model does a better job at explaining WML 
returns, than the FF3 model. This much is true for the robustness tests. Statistically 
significant coefficients of explanatory variables can be found in two of the four 
subsample time periods. The first is found in the second half time period, where HML 
has a negative loading of -0.66 with a p-value of 0.03, exhibiting a relatively high 
loading when compared to the respective Alpha of 1.47. This finding proposes the 
notion that returns to growth stocks played a part in contributing to industry Momentum 
returns in the time period spanning 1971 to 2015. The assertion could be put forward 
that the loser portfolio consists of value stocks and the winner portfolio consists of 
growth stocks, as industry Momentum overall exhibits a negative relation with the 
HML factor in the second half of the sample data. The second subsample time period 
with statistically significant coefficients is the period with no crashes. Here HML again 
is significant with a loading of -0.50 and a p-value of 0.05 and now too CMA is 
significant with a loading of 0.95 and a p-value of 0.03. In the case of HML, before 
looking at the no-crash period, one could have conjectured that HML gains in 
explanatory power in more recent years when controlling for more than just the FF3 
model factors. However, this conjecture is not as straight forward when viewed in the 
light of the significance of HML in the no-crash period. This would indicate that HML 
fairs well also outside recent years as long as there are no crashes that take away from 
the story of growth stocks explaining WML returns. The second half subsample time 
period however, includes a crash and this is confounding for the story presented earlier. 
This only raises further questions as to the varying significance of HML in explaining 
WML returns in relation to the characteristics of tested time periods. CMA on the other 
hand presents significance when industry Momentum prevails without crashes. This 
could be indicative of firms with conservative investments exhibiting Momentum. The 
loading of CMA is relatively high (0.95) so this could be plausible, but the observation 
of including crashes in time periods takes away from this theory, as it would seemingly 
break down when Momentum indeed crashes. This break down could be intuitively 
attributed to rebounding loser industries making a sudden change to conservative 
investments instead of aggressive ones, which they have committed to earlier in this 
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scenario. This explanation however, seems highly arbitrary in nature and as with HML, 
only raises further questions to be answered via further potential research. Finally, the 
FF5 model leaves much to be desired when it comes to explaining WML* returns. As 
for the whole sample time period, none of the coefficients for explanatory variables are 
significant at the 5 % level in the subsample time periods. The closest any coefficient 
comes to 5 % significance is the MKT-RF factor in the second half time period, where it 
has a loading of -0.14 with a p-value of 0.06. Even though the factor is close to the cut 
off rate for statistical significance, the economic magnitude is small in relation to the 
Alpha coefficient of 1.11. Thus, nothing truly insightful can be said of market returns 
explaining returns to risk-managed industry Momentum in the second half time period. 
As such, the findings of WML* producing abnormal returns that cannot be explained by 
the FF3 or FF5 model remain robust to different time periods. 
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Table 11. The table reports the results of the Fama-French five factor model regressions for its sub-sample 
time-periods. First half covers 1963-1989, second half covers 1989-2015, no-crash is the period 1963-2015 
without the crash year of 2009, and post-war covers 1963-2005. Alpha is the intercept of the regression, MKT-
RF is the market return minus the risk-free rate, SMB is the returns to Small minus Big stocks, and HML is the 
return to High book-to-market minus returns to Low book-to-market, RMW is the returns of Robust minus 
Weak operating profitability portfolios, and CMA is the returns to Conservative minus Aggressive investment 
portfolios. WML is the return to industry Momentum and WML* is the return to risk-managed industry 
Momentum. All regressions are Newey-West (1987) corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
Momentum returns have been dated back 212 years to the Victorian age in the United 
Kingdom, in over 20 years of out-of-sample data, in over 40 countries and in more than 
a dozen asset classes. Even further, some of the evidence concerning Momentum 
predates academic research in financial economics, possibly suggesting that the 
phenomenon has been a part of markets ever since they came into existence. (Asness et 
al., 2014) 
 
Asness et al. (2014) provides a strong case for utilizing Momentum as an investment 
strategy. As they point out, Momentum has been shown to prevail in not only individual 
stocks, but in out-of-sample data expanding outside the realm of traditional individual 
stock Momentum. This includes industries, where Momentum also succeeds in 
producing abnormal returns (Grinblatt & Moskowitz, 1999; Pan et al., 2004; Nijman et 
al., 2004; Du & Denning, 2005). However, even the most skeptic opposition of 
Momentum have found fault in its negative skewness that is prone to crashes. This is 
precisely why the findings of Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) are so significant: they 
manage to decrease the downside effect on Momentum returns by managing its crash 
risk with realized variances of its daily returns. This risk-management arguably doesn’t 
rid Momentum of crashes entirely, but it manages to dull down the effects they have on 
returns. As the methodology of Barroso and Santa Clara is full of potential and real-life 
implications, it begs for out-of-sample tests, which is why studying their risk-
management methodology in industry Momentum is so important. Whether or not this 
provides evidence of the profitability of risk-managed industry Momentum, the 
repercussions affect possible implications of trading strategies, the future research on 
risk-managing Momentum, and the overall importance of industry Momentum. 
 
Risk-managed industry Momentum is profitable in the U.S. stock market. This 
effectively concludes the research conducted and presented in this thesis. The results 
that were found rejected the null hypotheses and are remarkably robust to a handful of 
out-of-sample tests concerning different time periods. These results are interesting not 
only because they offer up a new contribution to financial academic literature, but also 
because they have a potential real world impact. It is more than feasible to see risk-
managed industry Momentum as an investment strategy for example for mutual funds 
or hedge funds. After all, there is no shortage of strategies that produce 17.74 % average 
annualized returns with positive skewness and kurtosis values that indicate near normal 
distribution of returns. Additionally, the Sharpe ratio of the strategy implemented here 
(0.89) trumps that of traditional industry Momentum (0.60) by 48.33 %. From an 
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academic point of view, the effectiveness of risk-managing industry Momentum using 
realized variances of daily returns supports the case of Barroso and Santa Clara (2015). 
Risk-managing Momentum returns is now a much more widespread phenomenon as its 
efficacy has been shown not only in individual stock Momentum, but in industries as 
well. The prevalence of risk-management in both Momentum classes offers up evidence 
as well for the argument that the source of returns for individual stock Momentum and 
industry Momentum is the same, which is an issue of heated discussion (Grinblatt & 
Moskowitz, 1999; Nijman et al., 2004; Pan et al., 2004; Du & Denning, 2005). There is 
logic in arguing for the source of returns being the same as the same method of risk-
management works for both classes of Momentum. What that source may be however, 
is still a mystery that requires solving. 
 
 Suggestions for further research are numerous. Now that risk-managing Momentum 
has been expanded into industries, different asset classes warrant a look as well. How 
does risk-managing Momentum in currencies or fixed income securities fare for 
example? This presents an interesting research question not only because of its real-life 
applications to trading, but because it would again act as out-of-sample testing for 
Barroso and Santa Clara (2015). Studying risk-managed industry Momentum in 
different countries is a natural continuation of this thesis as well. Barroso and Santa 
Clara conducted out-of-sample tests in 21 different countries in total. Doing the same 
extensive international testing would arguably be too strenuous a task for a Master’s 
thesis and as such is left for further research at this time. Even further still, using 
realized variances of daily returns may be used to test risk-management in other 
strategies that suffer from crash risks. Currencies were mentioned earlier and carry 
trades in the FOREX market might make for an interesting research topic, as it too 
suffers from crashes inherent in its negatively skewed return distribution. Is risk-
management via realized variances applicable to carry trades? These are just some ideas 
that would make for suitable future research in the wake of the completion of this thesis. 
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